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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs' use of their 
property is a valid "nonconforming use" that cannot be prohibited by a subsequent 
change in the zoning law. 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Town of Aha v. Ben Hame Corp,, 836 P.2d 
797, 800 (Utah App. 1992). 
Preservation of Issue: The issue was raised and decided in favor of plaintiffs. (R. 
125-36, 254-55; Transcript of Trial, hereafter "Tr.,v at 167-77, 183-85.) 
2. Whether the district court correctly concluded that, as an alternative basis for 
relief to plaintiffs, zoning estoppel precludes the City from enforcing its new zoning 
ordinance against plaintiffs. 
Standard of Review: Correctness. Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame Corp., supra, at 
800, 802-03. 
Preservation of Issue: The issue was raised and decided in favor of plaintiffs. (R. 
125, 132, 252-54; Tr. 176-77.) 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and ordinances are determinative of the issues presented 
and are set forth verbatim in the Addendum: U.C.A. §§ 10-9-103(l)(k) and -408(l)(a); 
Woods Cross Zoning Ordinance § 11-13-1(A) and 11-22-1. (Add. 35-45.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff trucking company to enjoin the city's 
enforcement of a new zoning ordinance that prevents parking of trucks and trailers on 
plaintiffs property. The district court denied cross-motions for summary judgment on 
the basis of material fact disputes. Following a bench trial, the district court entered its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of plaintiffs, holding that 
plaintiffs' use of their property is a valid non-conforming use that may continue under 
the new zoning law and, alternatively, that zoning estoppel precludes the city from 
enforcing its new zoning law to prevent plaintiffs' historical use of their property. (R. 
246, Add. 19.) The city appeals from that judgment. (R. 258.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Original Ownership and Use of the Property 
Plaintiffs, Damon and Debbie Hugoe and Hugoe Trucking, Inc. (collectively 
"Hugoes"), own 3.5 acres of land (hereafter "the Property") located at approximately 
1200 West and 500 South in Woods Cross City ("the City"). The Property and an 
"Adjacent Parcel" were originally owned as a single tract of land by Frank Branch, who 
acquired the land to construct a semi-truck maintenance shop. The entire tract was under 
the jurisdiction of Davis County ("the County") prior to annexation by the City in 1988. 
(Findings of Fact 1-4; Tr. 4-5,47; PL Exh. 1, Add. 32.) 
In approximately 1985, Mr. Branch leased the Property to Clarence Newman and 
sold the Adjacent Parcel to Richard Fleming. Up until the time the Property was sold to 
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Hugoes in 1991, Mr. Newman used the Property for parking his large trucks and semi-
trailers that he used in his insulation business. No one from the County ever objected to 
Mr. Newman's use of the Property or gave any indication that his use was unlawful or 
required a permit. From 1985 to the present, Mr. Fleming has used the Adjacent Parcel 
for parking and storage of his construction equipment and vehicles, including semi-
trucks and trailers, dump trucks, and loaders. In 1985, Mr. Fleming obtained a permit 
from the County to install a culvert that was used for access to both parcels. The County 
also authorized and assisted in hauling fill material onto both parcels. The County knew 
how the two properties were being used and never objected to that use or gave any 
indication that the use was unlawful or required a permit. Because 500 South is a major 
east-west thoroughfare, the use of these two adjacent parcels was open, obvious, and 
observable. (Findings of Fact 1, 5-8; Tr. 5-6, 13-15, 17-20, 22-30, 34, 38-39, 42-43; PL 
Exh. 1.) 
Annexation and Continued Use of the Property 
In 1988, Mr. Branch and Mr. Fleming were contacted by Ralph Argyle, Mayor of 
Woods Cross City, to enlist their support in the proposed City annexation of land that 
included their adjacent properties. Branch and Fleming both asked Mayor Argyle 
whether annexation would change or preclude the use of their properties for parking and 
maintenance of semi-trucks, trailers, and related vehicles. The mayor responded that the 
City had no objection to their current use of the properties and that annexation would not 
change or limit that use. The mayor repeated this assurance on several subsequent 
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occasions prior to annexation. Debbie Hugoe was present at some of these meetings and 
heard the mayor's assurances regarding continued use of the properties. The mayor 
never questioned the use of the properties for parking of trucks and trailers and never 
stated that a permit would be required for that use. In reliance on the mayor's assurances, 
both Branch and Fleming supported annexation. The annexation was formally approved 
on December 6, 1988. (Findings of Fact 9; Tr. 7-12, 34-39, 66-67; PL Exhs. 7-8.) 
Upon annexation by the City, the adjacent Branch and Fleming properties were 
included in Commercial Zone C-2. Following annexation, Mr. Newman (as Branch's 
lessee) and Mr. Fleming continued to use the properties as before, for parking and 
storage of trucks, trailers, and related equipment. No one from the City ever objected to 
their use of the properties, nor ever notified them that their use was illegal under the C-2 
zoning or required any approval or permit from the City. In fact, Tim Stephens, the 
City's Community Development Director, responsible for administration of planning and 
zoning matters, testified that uses permitted by the County did not require site plan 
approval upon annexation into the City. Moreover, no one from the City ever questioned 
whether the use of annexed properties had been approved by the County, and Mr. 
Stephens did not know whether the use of these properties had been approved by the 
County. (Findings of Fact 6-8; Tr. 14-16, 19-21, 38-39, 43,106-08,122,133-34, 143, 
163-66; PL Exh. 7.) 
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Plaintiffs' Purchase and Use of the Property 
Damon and Debbie Hugoe own Hugoe Trucking, Inc., which engages in interstate 
transport of various commodities, as well as local hauling of sand and gravel products. 
They have been in business since 1979. They currently employ up to fifty people and 
operate over twenty trucks and trailers of various kinds and sizes. (Tr. 45-49, 53-55; PI. 
Exh. 4.) 
In May of 1991, Hugoes were looking for a parcel of land that they could use as a 
staging ground to park their trucks and trailers between trips. They were referred to 
Frank Branch, who offered the 3.5-acre parcel he had been leasing to Clarence Newman. 
This Branch parcel ("the Property") seemed ideal for the Hugoes' purposes because it 
had been used for parking of trucks and trailers by Mr. Newman, the Adjacent Parcel had 
also been used for the same purpose by Richard Fleming, and the Property was located 
near to the Hugoes' office and home, in close proximity to gravel pits and freeway 
access. (Finding of Fact 10; Tr. 46-49, 52-53, 58, 80-81.) 
Before purchasing the Property, Debbie Hugoe went to the City offices to verify 
the zoning and permitted uses to ensure there would be no restriction on any part of their 
business. She met with Tim Stephens and told him that she owned Hugoe Trucking, that 
she was interested in purchasing the Branch property for the purpose of parking trucks 
and trailers, and that she wanted to verify that current zoning permitted the proposed use. 
Mr. Stephens responded that the Property was zoned C-2 and gave Mrs. Hugoe a copy of 
the C-2 zoning ordinance. Mrs. Hugoe then read through the permitted uses, with Mr. 
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Stephens looking on, and checked the uses that might pertain to her business, including 
transfer company, repair garage, tire shop, and accessory uses and buildings incidental to 
those uses. Mr. Stephens made no statement or indication that Hugoes9 proposed use 
was not permitted by the zoning, or that such use required a permit or approval from the 
City, or that any zoning change was planned. Based on the prior and current uses of the 
Property and Adjacent Parcel, the apparent inclusion of such uses in the C-2 zoning 
ordinance, and the absence of any objection or further requirement from the City, Hugoes 
purchased the Property in June 1991 for $75,000. (Findings of Fact 10-13; Tr. 47, 49-
53, 56-59, 92-93, 109-10, 151; PL Exhs. 2, 5, Add. 35.) 
Following purchase of the Property, Hugoes began parking their trucks and 
trailers on the Property. To improve the Property for this use, Hugoes began hauling in 
fill material and gravel to level the surface and eliminate low spots that accumulated 
moisture. Some of this fill material included ground asphalt removed from City streets 
under a street-repair contract with Staker Paving. Scott Anderson, City Public Works 
Director, came to the Property, observed the use of the Property and the placement of fill, 
and notified Hugoes that a fill permit was required. That same day, August 12, 1991, 
Debbie Hugoe went to the City offices and met with Tim Stephens to apply for a fill 
permit. Mr. Stephens provided a form, titled "Building Permit Application," and marked 
with an "x" the lines that Mrs. Hugoe was to complete, basically identifying information. 
Mr. Stephens then filled in the property number, the type of improvement as "Fill," the 
C-2 zoning designation, the zoning approval, and the fee. They discussed the purpose of 
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the fill, the type of fill material, and the use of the Property. Mrs. Hugoe asked if their 
use of the Property was "totally legal," and Mr. Stephens said, "Yes." Mr. Stephens gave 
no indication that any further permit or site plan approval was required, and he made no 
mention of any proposed zoning change. He issued the fill permit two days later, again 
with no restriction or requirement of any further approval or permit. With the permit, 
Hugoes completed their improvement of the Property, applying roughly three feet of fill 
material over the entire Property, thirty-to-forty thousand tons, at a cost of over 
$200,000. (Findings of Fact 13-19; Tr. 41-42, 59-65, 68-71, 87, 94, 110-14, 135-41, 
153-54; PL Exh. 3, Add. 33.) 
From their purchase of the Property in June 1991 until March 1992, the Hugoes 
used the Property for parking their trucks and trailers with no objection or notice from 
the City that such use was not permitted, that site plan approval was required, or that a 
zoning change was proposed or had occurred. (Finding of Fact 20; Tr. 71-72, 75, 155-
56.) 
Zoning Change and City Objections 
On March 27, 1992, Tim Stephens sent a letter to the Hugoes notifying them that 
the zoning of their Property had been changed to I-l Light Industrial, that the new zoning 
did not permit parking and open storage of trucks and large equipment, and that they 
must "cease and desist" such use of the Property without a site plan approval. (PL Exhs. 
6, 9; Def. Exh. 2.) This was the Hugoes' first notice of the zoning change and of any 
objection to their use of the Property. Mrs. Hugoe immediately called Mr. Stephens and 
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inquired whether they should request site plan approval, and he responded that such a 
request would do no good because it would be denied. He said that trucks could be 
parked on the Property only in a large garage. Because covered parking for all their 
trucks and trailers was not feasible, and Hugoes could find no other similar and 
affordable property for their purposes, Hugoes continued to use the Property for parking 
their trucks and trailers. The City sent subsequent notices to the Hugoes ordering them to 
remove their trucks, trailers and related equipment from the Property, and threatening 
prosecution if they did not comply. Having no alternative, other than going out of 
business, Hugoes have continued using the Property to park their trucks and trailers. 
(Findings of Fact 21-22; Tr. 72, 74-77, 81-83, 114-16, 142-45; Def. Exhs. 4-6.) 
In August 1995, the City served a criminal information on the Hugoes, charging 
them with violating the new 1-1 Industrial/Business Park zoning by using their Property 
for open storage of trucks, trailers, and related equipment. (R. 57.) Hugoes responded 
by commencing this action to enjoin enforcement of the new zoning law to prevent the 
historical use of their Property. (R. 1.) The district court denied the parties' cross-
motions for summary judgment, finding material issues of fact. (R. 220-23, Add. 30.) 
Following a bench trial, the court entered a lengthy and detailed Trial Ruling, setting 
forth findings of fact and concluding that (1) Hugoes9 use of the Property is a valid 
nonconforming use that may continue under the new zoning law; and (2) the elements of 
zoning estoppel are satisfied to prevent the City from enforcing its new zoning law 
against Hugoes. (R. 228, Add. 1.) The court incorporated that ruling in its Findings of 
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Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. (R. 246, Add. 19.) The City appeals from that 
final judgment. (R. 258.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The judgment in this case is based on the findings and conclusions of the district 
court, as entered by the court following a bench trial. The findings in support of the 
conclusions and judgment cannot be set aside unless shown to be clearly erroneous. The 
City has failed to meet that burden. Therefore, the conclusions and judgment, as 
otherwise supported by the law, must be affirmed. 
Hugoes' use of their Property to park trucks and trailers is a vested 
nonconforming use because it validly existed prior to the 1992 zoning change that 
outlaws such use. Hugoes' predecessor used the Property for the same purpose prior to 
annexation in 1988, and up to the purchase by Hugoes in 1991. Prior to purchase, 
Hugoes obtained assurances from the City zoning administrator that their use was 
permitted under the current C-2 zoning. Hugoe Trucking is a permitted "transfer 
company" within the meaning of the zoning ordinance. The zoning administrator again 
assured Hugoes that their use was "legal" when he issued a fill permit, allowing Hugoes 
to improve the Property for the planned use. The zoning administrator never told 
Hugoes that their use was not permitted, or that they were required to obtain a site plan 
approval. In fact, no site plan was required because Hugoes were merely continuing the 
same use as their predecessor. Hugoes acquired a vested right to continue using their 
Property to park trucks and trailers. 
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Alternatively, Hugoes have vested rights under the doctrine of zoning estoppel 
because they incurred substantial expense for improvements to the Property in reliance 
on the zoning administrator's assurances that their use was legal, on his issuance of the 
fill permit for the purpose of facilitating that use, and on his failure to notify them that 
their use was improper or required site plan approval. In response to Mrs. Hugoe's 
specific inquiries regarding the permissibility of their use, the zoning administrator had a 
duty to inform her of any supposed problem or further requirement. The City's power of 
zoning enforcement is limited by principles of equity when the City has allowed vested 
rights to intervene, and no vital public interest is at stake. Finally, the district court 
properly relied on zoning estoppel in its judgment, even though the theory was not 
mentioned by name in the complaint, because the evidence related to estoppel is the same 
as for the vested rights theory, and the evidence was admitted without objection from the 
City. 
ARGUMENT 
The purpose of zoning laws is to promote the health, safety, prosperity, and 
general welfare of the community by, among other things, minimizing potential conflicts 
between incompatible uses of property in the same area. See, e.g., Patterson v. Utah 
County Bd of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah App. 1995); U.C.A. § 10-9-102. 
However, "because zoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's common-
law right to unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein restricting property 
uses should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses should be 
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liberally construed in favor of the property owner." Patterson, supra, at 606 n.10 (where 
doubt exists, zoning ordinance must be interpreted in favor of the property owner). 
Courts are free to enjoin or set aside zoning provisions or actions that are confiscatory, 
arbitrary, unreasonable, contrary to statute, or that do not further their declared purpose. 
See, e.g., Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559, 562 (Utah 1967); 
Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah 1982); Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 141 P.2d 
704, 708-09 (Utah 1943); Wood v. North Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858, 860 (Utah 1964). 
POINT I: HUGOES' USE OF THEIR PROPERTY TO PARK TRUCKS AND 
TRAILERS IS A VALID NONCONFORMING USE THAT MAY 
CONTINUE UNDER THE NEW ZONING LAW. 
A. Law of Nonconforming Use 
Zoning laws, by their own terms and as enforced by the courts, generally have no 
retroactive application to deprive a property owner of a valid existing use. Under this 
doctrine of "nonconforming use," a use of property that lawfully existed prior to a 
change in the zoning law is considered a vested property right and may be maintained 
under the new law even though that use does not conform to the new law. 4 Ziegler, 
Rathkopf s The Law of Zoning and Planning § 51.01[l]-[2] (4 th ed. 1998). This 
protected status accorded lawful existing nonconforming uses may be based on 
constitutional interpretation, specific statutory or ordinance provisions, or equitable 
estoppel. A zoning provision that deprives a property owner of an existing lawful use is 
considered confiscatory and an unconstitutional taking of the property without 
compensation and due process. Statutory and ordinance provisions protecting 
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nonconforming uses are intended to avoid unconstitutional application of the zoning 
laws. Id. § 51.01[2][a]-[c]. The vested right to a nonconforming use runs with the land 
and is, therefore, not affected by annexation or changes in ownership. Id. §§ 51.02[h] 
and51.03[l]. 
Utah zoning law has long protected nonconforming uses. The original 
nonconforming use statute, passed in 1925 and codified as section 10-9-6, U.C.A. 
(1986), provided that zoning powers "shall not be exercised so as to deprive the owner of 
any property of its use for the purpose to which it is then lawfully devoted." (Add. 46.) 
Current law, U.C.A. § 10-9-408 of the Municipal Land Use Development and 
Management Act, states: 
(l)(a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or 
structure may be continued. 
(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or 
amendment for: 
(a) the establishment... of nonconforming uses upon the 
terms and conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance. [Add. 42.] 
Section 10-9-103(l)(k) defines a nonconforming use: 
"Nonconforming use" means a use of land that: 
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning 
regulation governing the land changed; and 
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(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with 
the zoning regulations that now govern the land. [Add. 44.] 
The Woods Cross City Zoning Ordinance also specifically protects 
nonconforming uses. Section 11-22-1 states: 
Any lawful use of buildings or land at the time of the passage of this 
Ordinance, which does not conform to the regulations prescribed in this 
Ordinance, shall be deemed a non-conforming use and such use may be 
continued . . . . [Def. Exh. 7, Add. 40.] 
Ordinance section 11-2-1 defines "nonconforming use" as "[t]he use of any building or 
premises contrary to the use regulations of this Ordinance for the zone in which the 
building or premises is located." (Def. Exh. 7.) 
B. Application to Present Case 
Under the foregoing statutes and ordinances, Hugoes' use of the Property to park 
their trucks and trailers is a vested nonconforming use. In compliance with statutory 
section 10-9-103(l)(k), this use legally existed prior to the current zoning ordinance. 
Prior to annexation in 1988, the Property was used by lessee Clarence Newman to park 
the large trucks and trailers used in his insulation business. As the district court found, 
the County knew of, and never objected to, this use, and there is no allegation or 
evidence that this use was contrary to the County zoning ordinance. (Ruling pp. 9, 11, 
Add. 9, 11.) The City does not challenge these findings. Following annexation, Mr. 
Newman continued to use the Property for the same purpose, as promised by the City 
mayor, under the City's initial C-2 zoning designation. Upon their purchase of the 
Property in 1991, Hugoes began using the Property for the same purpose, the parking of 
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trucks and trailers, under the same C-2 zoning. That zoning regulation lists "transfer 
company" as one of the permitted uses. Ordinance § 11-13-1(A)(45) (PL Exh. 5, Add. 
36.) The district court expressly found that Hugoe Trucking is a "transfer company" 
within the meaning of the C-2 zoning ordinance. (Ruling pp. 14-16; Conclusion of Law 
8; Add. 14-16, 27.) Moreover, as the district court also found, Hugoes obtained an 
assurance from the City prior to purchase that their proposed use was permitted by the 
zoning; they obtained a fill permit from the City to facilitate their known use of the 
Property; and the City, knowing of Hugoes' use, never objected to that use or gave any 
indication that the use was contrary to the C-2 zoning. (Ruling pp. 2-4, 9-10; Findings of 
Fact 10-12, 15-17; Add. 2-4, 9-10, 22-24.) The City does not challenge these findings. 
Based on these findings, Hugoes' use of the Property "legally existed" when the zoning 
was changed, as the district court correctly concluded. (Ruling pp. 14-16; Conclusions 
of Law 7-10; Add. 14-16, 27-28.) The parties do not dispute the second and third 
elements of the definition for nonconforming use. (Id.) Therefore, Hugoes have a valid 
and vested nonconforming use that may continue under the new zoning law. 
Utah case law amply supports this conclusion of nonconforming use. For 
example, in Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559 (Utah 1967), the 
subject property had historically been used for the excavation of sand and gravel, but in 
1957 the property was zoned residential. Extraction activities continued, and the plaintiff 
acquired the property two years later with the expectation of continuing such use under 
the prior nonconforming use statute, section 10-9-6 (Add. 46). Id. at 561 n.l. The 
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plaintiff continued excavation activities until the city issued a stop order. The plaintiff 
then sued to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. Following a trial, the district court 
ruled that because the property had been used for excavation prior to the zoning 
ordinance, "any prohibition of use would be unreasonable and confiscatory and would 
result in the taking of private property without due process." Id. at 561. The Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding the nonconforming use statute "determinative." Id. at 562. In 
light of the existing use of the property, the potential financial loss to the owner, and the 
absence of any compelling public interest in enforcing the new ordinance, the court 
concluded that enforcement would be "an invalid exercise of the police power." Id. at 
563-64. The court rejected the city's arguments that the plaintiff had extended its 
excavation to this property after the zoning ordinance, that the plaintiff had purchased the 
property with full knowledge of the zoning restriction, and that zoning law favors 
elimination of nonconforming uses. Id. at 564. The plaintiffs continued excavation on 
the property "was a valid nonconforming use." Id. at 565. 
The same result is even more compelling in the present case because Hugoes 
purchased their Property with the understanding and assurance that parking of trucks and 
trailers was permitted by the current zoning. Moreover, that use of the Property has not 
changed from what it was prior to annexation, prior to Hugoes' purchase, and prior to the 
zoning change, or what it has been since the zoning change. As in Gibbons & Reed, 
enforcement of the zoning ordinance in this case would cause severe financial hardship 
to Hugoes, while serving none of the public interests zoning is intended to serve. The 
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Property is surrounded by similar businesses, and the commercial character of the area 
has not changed since the Hugoes' purchase in 199L (Tr. 28-29, 56-57, 155.) The City 
has identified no adverse consequence from allowing Hugoes to continue their 
nonconforming use. On these facts, the district court properly enjoined enforcement of 
the new zoning ordinance to prohibit Hugoes' use of their Property. See Gibbons & 
Reed, supra, at 561-62; Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Utah 1977) 
(upholding nonconforming use in keeping farm animals on residential property); Rock 
Manor Trust v. State Road Commission, 550 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1976) (upholding 
nonconforming use of barn wall for commercial advertising even after barn burned and 
was rebuilt); Clinton City v. Patterson, 433 P.2d 7, 9 (Utah 1967) (upholding 
nonconforming use of land for cattle feedlot and pasture); Swenson v. Salt Lake City, 398 
P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1965) (vested right to nonconforming use of carport). 
Because the right to a nonconforming use is considered a "vested right," 4 The 
Law of Zoning and Planning, supra, § 51.01 [2], the district court's judgment in favor of 
Hugoes is also supported by the analogous case of Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of 
Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). There, a residential developer applied for approval of 
a subdivision that was permitted by current zoning. The city denied approval and then 
changed its zoning to prohibit the subdivision. Id. at 389-90. The court held that the city 
illegally withheld subdivision approval because the developer acquired a vested right to 
approval at the time of his application, if the development met the zoning requirements in 
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effect at that time. Id. at 396. The court acknowledged the need to balance the public 
and private interests in the area of land use and development: 
A property owner should be able to plan for developing his property in a 
manner permitted by existing zoning regulations with some degree of 
assurance that the basic ground rules will not be changed in midstream.... 
An applicant for approval of a planned and permitted use should not be 
subject to shifting policies that do not reflect serious public concerns. [Id.] 
Similarly, Hugoes acquired a vested right when they began using their Property to park 
trucks and trailers in conformance with the current zoning in 1991. That right was 
strengthened by the City's issuance of the fill permit, approving the Property 
improvements that enabled the proposed use. To allow the City, now, to change the rules 
of use "midstream" on the basis of "shifting policies that do not reflect serious public 
concerns" would constitute an unlawful exercise of the police power and deprive Hugoes 
of their vested right. 
C. City Arguments Against Nonconforming Use 
As noted, the City does not challenge any findings of fact and has not marshaled 
the evidence to demonstrate that any particular finding is "clearly erroneous." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 52(a). Accordingly, the findings of fact, as well as the legal conclusions that 
necessarily follow therefrom, must be accepted on appeal. See, e.g., West Valley City v. 
Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991) (appellant city failed to 
catalogue evidence in support of any challenged finding to demonstrate that such finding 
was "clearly erroneous"). 
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The City argues that Hugoes have no vested nonconforming use because their use 
was not legally established prior to the zoning change. The City then offers various 
reasons why Hugoes' use of the Property was not legal. (Br. of App. 29-35.) However, 
none of those supposed reasons is valid. 
The City first argues that its C-2 zoning ordinance limited uses within that zone to 
"retail-type businesses," and that Hugoes were not conducting any business on the 
Property, but merely using it to park trucks, while conducting "business" in their West 
Bountiful office. (Br. of App. 30-31.) This argument borders on the frivolous. The City 
fails to mention that the Hugoes' business office, while located in West Bountiful, is only 
two lots away from the Property at issue. (Tr. 46.) Moreover, because the Hugoes' 
business is trucking, the parking and staging of those trucks on the Property is an integral 
part of their business. See Gibbons & Reed, supra, 431 P.2d at 564 (property on which 
construction company stored gravel excavated from other parcels "was an integral part of 
the gravel operation"). In any event, Hugoe Trucking is every bit as much a "retail-type 
business" as a bus depot, wholesale ice store, dental laboratory, fire station, rescue 
mission, or the other permitted uses listed under the C-2 zoning ordinance. (See PL Exh. 
5, Add. 35.) 
The City next asserts that a trucking business is not a permitted use under the C-2 
zoning ordinance. (Br. of App. 31.) However, as noted above, the district court 
expressly found that a trucking company is a "transfer company" within the meaning of 
the zoning ordinance. Section 11-13-1(A)(45) (Add. 36.) The court cited several cases 
18 
equating a "transfer company" with a transportation or trucking company. (Ruling pp. 
14-15, Add. 14-15.) See, e.g., Armco Steel v. City of Kansas City, 883 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Mo. 
1994) ("a transfer company includes any company in the business of transporting freight 
or other products for hire"). The City makes no attempt to challenge the district court's 
finding or to distinguish the cited authorities. Moreover, zoning "provisions permitting 
property uses should be liberally construed in favor of the property owner." Patterson, 
supra, 893 P.2d at 606. Therefore, this Court must accept the district court's conclusion 
that Hugoes' use of the Property was legally permitted under the prior zoning ordinance. 
Alternatively, the City argues that Hugoes' use of the Property was unlawful 
because they never obtained a site plan approval. (Br. of App. 31-35.) However, as the 
district court ruled, a site plan is required only for construction of buildings or for 
proposed uses "that change the character and use of the land." (Ruling p. 11, Add. 11.) 
A site plan is not required "every time a business property is sold and new owners use the 
property for essentially the same purpose." {Id.) The City does not challenge that 
conclusion, but argues in response that Hugoes' use of the Property "is obviously 
markedly different" from the prior use by Clarence Newman. (Br. of App. 32; see also 
pp. 34-35.) However, the City employs unsupported hyperbole in place of facts. The 
district court found that Mr. Newman used the Property "to park semi-trucks and trailers 
and large insulation trucks." (Ruling p. 2; see also Finding of Fact 6; Add. 2, 21.) Based 
on this finding, which the City does not challenge, the district court specifically 
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concluded that Hugoes needed no building permit or site plan approval to continue that 
same use: 
Plaintiffs needed no building permit to use the land in the manner in which 
it had always been used . . . . As to defendant's argument that a "site plan" 
was needed to be legal, the Court cannot agree. The only thing that 
changed when ownership changed was the name and shape of the trucks 
being parked on the land. [Ruling pp. 10-11, Add. 10-11.] 
Accordingly, because the City accepts the premise that only a change in use triggers the 
site plan requirement (Br. of App. 35), and the City fails even to attempt to marshal the 
evidence to challenge the court's finding that Hugoes did not change the use of the 
Property, it follows that no site plan was required to validate Hugoes' use. Therefore, 
Hugoes' use of the Property was valid prior to the zoning change. * 
Finally, the City argues that Hugoes acquired no vested right under the case of 
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, discussed above, because the fill permit did 
not commit the Property to any particular use. (Br. of App. 36-37.) However, as noted 
above, Hugoes acquired a vested right when they commenced their valid use of the 
Property under the prior zoning ordinance, independent of the subsequent fill permit. 
Under the rationale of Western Land Equities, the City's granting of the fill permit, with 
1
 Even if a site plan approval were required, the district court would still be justified in finding a 
valid nonconforming use on the basis that Hugoes would have been entitled to approval under the prior 
zoning ordinance. For example, in City of New York v. Victory Van Lines, Inc., 418 N.Y.S.2d 792 (App. 
Div. 1979), the court held that parking of vans and trucks on a moving company's premises was a valid 
nonconforming use even though the company had failed to obtain a required permit for such parking. 
Because the company would have been entitled to such a permit if requested, the court would not allow a 
"technical irregularity" to prevent the continuance of an otherwise lawful use. Id. at 795. See also 
Hooper v. City of St. Paul, 353 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Minn. 1984) (violation of a technical permit 
requirement does not render a prior nonconforming use unlawful). 
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knowledge of the ongoing use, served to ratify and strengthen Hugoes' vested right. In 
Western Land Equities, the vested right to approval occurred upon the filing of the 
application, without official approval of the application. 617 P.2d at 392, 396. The 
vested right in the present case, then, is reaffirmed and even more secure following actual 
issuance of the permit that authorized the substantial Property improvements. 
In summary, Hugoes' parking of trucks and trailers on their Property is a vested 
nonconforming use because it legally existed before the zoning change in 1992. As 
noted, the parties do not dispute the remaining two elements of the nonconforming use 
definition. Therefore, such use of the Property "may be continued," and the City's 
efforts to stop that use are properly enjoined. 
POINT II: ALTERNATIVELY, ZONING ESTOPPEL PRECLUDES THE CITY 
FROM ENFORCING THE NEW ZONING ORDINANCE AGAINST 
THE HUGOES. 
A. Law of Zoning Estoppel 
Properly rights in the zoning context may also vest by application of equitable 
estoppel, or "zoning estoppel." Under the doctrine of zoning estoppel, a property 
owner's rights may be deemed vested, precluding enforcement of a zoning ordinance in a 
particular case, when the owner acted in good faith reliance on the city's actions, 
inaction, assurances, or current zoning in expending significant sums to improve or 
develop the property for a planned and permitted use, such that enforcement would be 
unfair under all the circumstances. Zoning estoppel may also be justified where there is 
bad faith or inequitable conduct by city officials, and no substantial public interest would 
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be served by enforcement of the ordinance in the particular case. See generally 4 The 
Law of Zoning and Planning, supra, § 50.05. 
The doctrine of zoning estoppel is firmly embedded in Utah law. The Utah 
Supreme Court, in Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, supra, acknowledged 
that "zoning estoppel... is widely followed" and described its application as follows: 
That principle estops a government entity from exercising its zoning 
powers to prohibit a proposed land use when a property owner, relying 
reasonably and in good faith on some governmental act or omission, has 
made a substantial change in position or incurred such extensive 
obligations or expenses that it would be highly inequitable to deprive the 
owner of his right to complete his proposed development. [617 P.2d at 
391.] 
The court observed that "[t]he main inquiry is whether there has been substantial reliance 
by the owner on governmental actions related to the superseded zoning that permitted the 
proposed use." Id. The specific concern is the "economic hardship that would be 
imposed on a property owner" whose use of the property is thwarted. Id. For example, 
in Wood v. North Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858, 859 (Utah 1964), the court held that a zoning 
ordinance requiring a certain size of lots could not equitably be enforced against a 
developer who had already provided water and sewer connections for smaller lots in 
conformance with a prior ordinance. Similar statements of the elements of zoning 
estoppel are set forth in other Utah cases. See, e.g., Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 
283, 290 (Utah App. 1994); Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1980). 
See also Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App. 1990) 
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(State Retirement Board equitably estopped to require retiree to "purchase" his retirement 
benefit when he had been informed prior to retirement that no purchase was necessary). 
B. Application to Present Case 
As held by the district court, the facts of the present case justify application of 
zoning estoppel to prevent enforcement of the new zoning ordinance against Hugoes. In 
1988, the City mayor induced Hugoes' predecessor, Frank Branch, and the owner of the 
Adjacent Parcel, Richard Fleming, to support annexation with the assurance that their 
current use of their properties to park trucks and related equipment would be permitted 
under City zoning and could continue following annexation. Mrs. Hugoe also heard, and 
later relied on, these assurances in purchasing the Property from Mr. Branch. (Ruling p. 
2; Findings of Fact 9; Add. 2, 22.) Prior to purchasing the Property in 1991, Mrs. Hugoe 
informed the City zoning administrator, Tim Stephens, of her proposed use of the 
Property and of her desire to verify that such use was permitted by current zoning. Mr. 
Stephens provided her with the C-2 zoning ordinance and tacitly approved her 
conclusion that parking of trucks was permitted under that zoning. (Ruling pp. 2-3; 
Findings of Fact 10-11; Add. 2-3, 22.) Mrs. Hugoe also observed that the Property and 
Adjacent Parcel were currently being used to park trucks and related equipment, as 
permitted by the City. (Ruling p. 3; Findings of Fact 12; Add. 3, 23.) Following 
Hugoes' purchase of the Property, the City Public Works Director came onto the 
Property, observed that fill material was being hauled in to accommodate the parking of 
trucks, and stated that a fill permit was required. In compliance, Mrs. Hugoe went to the 
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City office and informed Tim Stephens that she desired a permit to fill the Property for 
the parking of her trucks. Mr. Stephens issued the permit, assuring Mrs. Hugoe that her 
use of the Property was "totally legal." (Tr. 64; Ruling pp. 3-4; Findings of Fact 14-15; 
Add. 3-4, 23.) In reliance on this permit, the various assurances, and the absence of any 
statement or indication from the City that their use was illegal, Hugoes expended over 
$200,000 in filling and improving the Property for the parking of trucks and related 
vehicles. (Tr. 94; Ruling p. 4; Findings of Fact 18-19; Add. 4, 24.) The City made no 
objection to the Hugoes' use of their Property until March 1992, after the new 1-1 zoning 
ordinance was passed. (Ruling pp. 4-5; Findings of Fact 21-22; Add. 4-5, 24-25.)2 
The foregoing facts support zoning estoppel. The Hugoes relied reasonably and 
in good faith on the mayor's assurances prior to annexation, the City's acquiescence in 
the parking of trucks on the Property following annexation, the zoning administrator's 
approval of that same use prior to purchase and upon issuing the fill permit, the permit 
itself, and the absence of any objection from the City until March 1992. Hugoes made a 
substantial change in position by purchasing the Property for the purpose of parking their 
trucks and related vehicles, and they incurred substantial expense in improving the 
2
 The district court acknowledged a conflict in the evidence on whether Mr. Stephens informed Mrs. 
Hugoe of the need for a site plan approval at the time of issuing the fill permit. Mr. Stephens produced a 
"contemporaneous" memorandum to his file stating that he "made clear" that site plan approval was 
required before the Property could be used for any purpose. (Def. Exh. 1.) Mrs. Hugoe denied that there 
was any discussion or mention of site plan approval. (Tr. 64-65.) The district court disbelieved Mr. 
Stephens, noting that he had no memory of the discussion (Tr. 110), that his production of the 
memorandum was "convenient" (Ruling pp. 4, 10), and that a matter of such importance should have 
been noted on the fill permit itself (id.). The court expressly found that Mrs. Hugoe's testimony was 
more credible, and that Mr. Stephens' testimony regarding a site plan requirement was untrue. (Findings 
of Fact 16, Add. 23-24.) 
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Property for that specific use. Accordingly, "it would be highly inequitable" and would 
cause extreme "economic hardship," including loss of their investment and their business 
(Tr. 80-82), now to deprive Hugoes of the continued use of their Property. See Western 
Land Equities, supra, at 391. 
After carefully reviewing these facts (Ruling pp.9-11), the district court concluded 
that the elements of zoning estoppel were satisfied (id. at 12-13). Specifically, the court 
concluded that Mr. Stephens' issuance of the fill permit, with full knowledge of the use 
of the Properly, justified Hugoes in proceeding with that use. In addition, Stephens' 
failure to inform the Hugoes that their use was unlawful at the time of issuing the fill 
permit, despite Mrs. Hugoe's specific inquiry as to legality, constituted "a negligent 
omission by one who had a duty to act." (Id. at 12.) The court found "evidence only of 
good faith on the part of plaintiffs" in their "extensive" reliance on Stephens' acts and 
omissions in proceeding with improvement and use of the Property. (Id. at 13.) Finally, 
the court concluded that Hugoes satisfied any duty of inquiry by inspecting the Property 
and zoning ordinance prior to purchase, and by verifying their legal status with the City's 
zoning administrator when they obtained the fill permit. (Id. at 13; see Conclusions of 
Law 1-6, Add. 13, 25-27.) These findings and conclusions satisfy the elements of zoning 
estoppel. See Utah County v. Young, supra, 615 P.2d at 1267-68; City of Coral Gables 
v. Puiggros, 418 So. 2d 367 (Fla. App. 1982) (zoning estoppel based on expenditure of 
funds in reliance on assurance of city that use would be permitted); Drain v. Clackamas 
County, 585 P.2d 746 (Or. App. 1978) (estoppel based on delay in enforcement of 
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zoning requirements); Lefrak Forest Hills Corp. v. Galvin, 338 N.Y.S.2d 932 (App. Div. 
1972), affd, 298 N.E.2d 685 (N.Y. 1973) (estoppel based on prior approval of use and 
issuance of permit). 
In summary, the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law fully 
support application of zoning estoppel to preserve the Hugoes' vested right in the use of 
their Property. Moreover, because the City has failed to challenge any finding of fact by 
marshaling the evidence to demonstrate that any finding is clearly erroneous, the 
conclusions of law that follow therefrom must also be sustained. See West Valley City v. 
Majestic Investment Co., supra, 818 P.2d at 1315. 
C. City Arguments Against Zoning Estoppel 
The City argues that the district court erred in its conclusion that Tim Stephens 
had a duty to inform Mrs. Hugoe of any problem with her use of the Property at the time 
of issuing the fill permit. (Br. of App. 13-17.) However, the cases cited by the City are 
distinguishable. 
In Utah County v. Young, supra, the property owner knew that commercial use of 
his bam was unlawful under the zoning, misrepresented the proposed use in his building 
application, and proceeded with construction anyway in the hope that the zoning would 
be changed. Moreover, the jury found that no one from the county lead the owner to 
believe his use was lawful. The court held that "estoppel may not be used as a defense 
by one who has acted fraudulently, or in bad faith, or with knowledge." 615 P.2d at 
1267. By contrast, in the present case Hugoes believed that their use was permitted by 
26 
the zoning, and that belief was based not only on their observations of the same use by 
others, but on Mr. Stephens' issuance of the fill permit, with knowledge that the fill was 
related to their specific use, on his assurance that Hugoes were "totally legal," and on his 
failure to inform them that their use was not legal, if in fact it was not. Accordingly, 
estoppel here is based on an affirmative act, an affirmative statement, and an omission 
on which Hugoes relied to their detriment. As stated in Young and Western Land 
Equities, estoppel can be based on either an act or an omission. If based on an omission, 
Young requires "a negligent or culpable omission where the party failing to act was under 
a duty to do so." Id. at 1267-68. The district court here correctly concluded that 
Stephens did have such a duty (Ruling p. 12; Conclusion of Law 2), because he knew of 
the actual use, and Mrs. Hugoe did specifically "inquire and confer" with Stephens, the 
City's "zoning authority [,] regarding the uses of the property that would be permitted," as 
required by Young. Id. at 1268. If the law imposes on the owner "a duty to inquire," 
then certainly it imposes on the zoning authority "a duty to respond" to that inquiry. On 
these facts, a failure to respond justifies application of estoppel. See, e.g., Neal v. City of 
Kingman, 810 P.2d 572, 580-81 (Ariz. App. 1990), rev'don other grounds, 817 P.2d 
937 (Ariz. 1991) ("government can be estopped by its silence if it knows that another is 
relying to his detriment on such silence"); Town of Boulder v. Bullock, 632 P.2d 716, 720 
(Mont. 1981) (zoning estoppel based on issuance of permit and failure of town to 
communicate known zoning infraction); Board of Regents v. City of Seattle, 741 P.2d 11, 
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16 (Wash. 1987) ("Silence coupled with knowledge of an adverse claim will estop a 
party from later asserting an inconsistent claim.").3 
The City also relies on Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 
1992), for the proposition that Mr. Stephens had no duty to respond to Mrs. Hugoe's 
inquiries and that she was not justified in relying on his acts or omissions. (Br. of App. 
16-17.) However, in that case, estoppel was denied because the owner had used the 
home as a commercial lodge "long before the clerk issued the first 'lodging facility' 
business license. Thus, [the owner] has failed to show that it substantially changed its 
position to its detriment." 836 P.2d at 803. In addition, the court reasoned that it was 
unreasonable for the owner to rely exclusively on the errors of a "ministerial employee." 
Id. By contrast, in the present case, Hugoes did rely to their detriment on Stephens9 acts, 
statements, and omissions by expending over $200,000 to prepare their Property for a use 
that was known to Stephens. In addition, Stephens was not a "ministerial employee," but 
was the zoning administrator for the City. He personally provided Mrs. Hugoe with the 
zoning information, personally discussed the proposed use, personally issued the fill 
permit to facilitate that use, and personally failed to disclose that the proposed use was 
unlawful, if it was. Mr. Stephens is "the local zoning authority" with whom Mrs. Hugoe 
3
 The two non-Utah cases relied upon by the City are also distinguishable. In Maloofv. Gwinnett 
County, 200 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. 1973), the county did not know that the owner was going to put his kennel 
to commercial use, and no such use had been approved. Similarly, in Jackson v. Kenai Peninsula 
Borough, 733 P.2d 1038 (Alas. 1987), the city never approved the owner's commercial use of his garage. 
In the present case, by contrast, the City did know of Hugoes' use and approved that use tacitly prior to 
purchase and expressly upon issuance of the fill permit. 
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had a "duty to inquire and confer," as required by Young. The Utah Supreme Court 
would not have imposed such a duty of inquiry if owners were not entitled to rely on the 
information received. The result in Ben Hame Corp. is dictated by the absence of 
detrimental reliance. However, the law is well established that if a zoning authority acts 
in error, such as in issuing a permit, and the owner detrimentally relies, such as in 
commencing construction or improvements, the owner acquires a vested right that is 
protected by equitable estoppel. See 4 The Law of Zoning and Planning, supra, 
§ 50.05[4]. 
The City argues, as a matter of public policy, that it "cannot possibly bear the 
burden of informing every landowner of the relevant development requirements relating 
to their property" (Br. of App. 18), and that the City does not forfeit its power of 
enforcement through acquiescence. (Br. of App. 17-23.) However, this argument 
misses the points relevant to the estoppel analysis. While the City has no duty to inform 
"every landowner" of the proper use of their property, the City does have a duty to 
inform those few who come into the City office and specifically inquire of the zoning 
administrator whether their proposed use is permissible. As a matter of policy equal in 
importance to that urged by the City, property owners who desire to proceed cautiously 
and avoid the risk of a zoning conflict should be permitted to inquire regarding their 
proposed use and should be entitled to rely on the response. Even in those cases when 
the responsive action or information is erroneous, the aggrieved owner may invoke 
estoppel only based on detrimental reliance. Accordingly, the rule that a city does not 
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forfeit enforcement power through acquiescence is not absolute, but is tempered by 
principles of equity that afford relief from enforcement in cases of sufficient detrimental 
reliance, and where there is no countervailing public policy that requires enforcement. 
See, e.g., Wood v. North Salt Lake, supra, 390 P.2d at 859 (lots improved in reliance on 
prior approval); Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. App. 
1975) ("A citizen is entitled to rely on the assurances and commitments of a zoning 
authority and if he does, the zoning authority is bound by its representations, whether 
they be in the form of words or deeds.") See generally 4 The Law of Zoning and 
Plmining§50.05[3]n.23.4 
Finally, the City argues that the district court erred in relying on zoning estoppel 
because the word "estoppel" does not appear in the complaint and the City did not 
consent to trial of the estoppel issue. (Br. of App. 23-29.) However, as demonstrated in 
nearly all of the case and treatise authorities discussed by the parties, the issue of estoppel 
is virtually inseparable from the theory of vested rights through nonconforming use. See 
Western Land Equities, supra (discussing the similarities of estoppel and vested rights 
but choosing to grant relief under vested rights); Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283 
(Utah App. 1994) (discussing concepts of vested rights and estoppel under same facts); 
4
 Neither does application of zoning estoppel in this case establish a nonconforming use "by 
prescription," nor leave the Hugoes' Property "free from any manner of local regulation." (Br. of App. 
20-21.) A zoning authority is admittedly not bound by any time table or limitations period in enforcing 
its zoning ordinance. However, as demonstrated by the foregoing authorities, by delaying enforcement, 
the zoning authority does risk that vested rights will intervene, precluding enforcement under principles 
of equitable estoppel. Moreover, while a nonconforming use may continue, it remains subject to other 
zoning regulations, nuisance laws, limitations on change or expansion, and possible amortization and 
termination. See generally 4 The Law of Zoning and Planning, supra, chs. 51A and 5 IB. 
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Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., supra (analyzing estoppel and nonconforming use 
under same facts); County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 766, 772 
(Haw. 1982) ("In the land use context, the vested rights doctrine was employed 
synonymously with the estoppel theory by a majority of the courts . . . . " ) ; 4 The Law of 
Zoning and Planning § 50.05[4], p. 50-79 (theory of "zoning estoppel" is a "synthesis" 
of the doctrine of vested rights and traditional estoppel principles). Accordingly, the 
issues and evidence for the vested rights claim and zoning estoppel are the same. As 
discussed above, even the legal elements of the two theories overlap, with estoppel being 
applied to establish the vested rights, as done alternatively in this case. (Ruling p. 14.) 
See 4 The Law of Zoning and Planning § 51.01 [2] [a] (the vested status of a use may be 
achieved by equitable estoppel). 
Because the issues and evidence for vested rights and estoppel are the same, 
estoppel may be deemed raised by the complaint. Moreover, the City did not object to 
any of the evidence in support of estoppel, and the City has identified no actual prejudice 
in defending the case. Therefore, the complaint may be deemed amended, the issue was 
tried by the implied consent of the parties, and the judgment may properly be based on 
estoppel, as supported by the evidence. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b); Colman v. Colman, 
743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah App. 1987) ("If a theory of recovery is folly tried by the parties, 
the court may base its decision on that theory and deem the pleadings amended, even if 
the theory was not originally pleaded "); First Security Bank v. Colonial Ford, Inc., 
597 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1979) ("the underlying purpose of the rules is that judgment 
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should be granted in accordance with the law and the evidence as the ends of justice 
require"); General Ins. Co. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976) 
(implied consent for trial of issue may be found where evidence is introduced without 
objection). 
In summary, the City has presented no argument why zoning estoppel should not 
apply in this case. The City has neither challenged any factual finding of the district 
court, nor demonstrated that any legal conclusion is incorrect. Estoppel is based on the 
acts, statements, and omissions of the City mayor and zoning administrator. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the judgment of the district court 
on the grounds that Hugoes have a vested nonconforming use, and zoning estoppel 
prevents the City from enforcing its new zoning ordinance to stop Hugoes from parking 
trucks and trailers on their Property. 
Respectfully submitted this / f day of March, 1999. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
By: - g g a ^ C ^ ^ T ^ ^ ^ ^ 7 i 
Gregory S. Simonsen 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIA^QKTRI" 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH V \ j 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT \ Au 
DAMON HUGOE, DEBBIE HUGOE, and, 
HUGOE TRUCKING, INC., 
a Utah corporation 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal 
corporation and political subdivision of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
TRIAL RULING 
Case No. 960700425 
This matter came before the Court for trial to the Court on February 12, 1997. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Gregory Simonsen and Bryan Booth. The defendant was represented by 
Michael Hayes and Todd Godfrey. After the presentation of evidence and argument, the Court 
took the case under advisement to prepare a written opinion. The Court rules as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiffs' property and that of Mr. Richard Fleming lie adjacent to one another on the 
south side of 500 South at approximately 1300 West in Woods Cross City. 500 South is a major 
East-West thoroughfare in the city. 
Both parcels were previously owned by Mr. Frank Branch. In December of 1988 both 
parcels were annexed into Woods Cross City. 
Prior to December 1988 the property was located in the unincorporated area of Davis 
County. Mr. Fleming purchased his parcel from Mr. Branch in 1985. He obtained permission 
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from Davis County to place a culvert in front of his property to allow better access and to haul in 
fill. Much of the fill was hauled onto the property from Davis County retention basins as a result 
of the 1983 flooding. 
Mr. Fleming is in the construction business. Since he purchased the property in 1985, he 
has used it continuously to park dump trucks, belly dumps and various other pieces of heavy 
equipment. 
Mr. Branch retained ownership of the parcel now owned by the plaintiff. Over the years 
from at least 1985 until 1991, Mr. Branch allowed Mr. Clarence Newman to use the property. 
Mr. Newman was in the insulation business and used the property to park semi-trucks and trailers 
and large insulation trucks. 
The use of the two parcels for truck and equipment parking was open and obvious and 
clearly observable to anyone traveling on 500 South. The use continued from at least 1985 until 
present. 
In the year leading up to annexation of the property into Woods Cross City, Mr. Branch 
and Mr. Fleming had several conversations with the then mayor, Mr. Argyle, and attended 
several public meetings where they were encouraged to consent to annexation, with the assurance 
that they would be able to continue the current use of their property. Ms. Hugoe also attended 
some of these same meetings with her aunt, also a resident of the area. 
Prior to June 1991 plaintiffs became interested in the property and Ms. Hugoe went to the 
Woods Cross City offices to check the zoning of the property. She spoke with Mr. Stephens, the 
Community Development Director. He gave her a copy of the zoning ordinance, which showed 
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the property was in a C-2 zone. She noted that a permitted use in that zone was a "transfer 
company." 
Mr. Stephens had been employed as the Community Development Director for Woods 
Cross City since 1989. Before that he worked in the planning department of Davis County. In 
his position with Davis County he was familiar with the unincorporated area of the county. 
Ms. Hugoe told Mr. Stephens that they were a trucking company. Trucks bearing the 
Hugoe Trucking logo were often on the streets of Woods Cross City. Hugoe Trucking had been 
used on several road construction jobs in the city hauling road base and "roto-mill" to and from 
the road projects. Mr. Stephens was aware that the Hugoes were involved in a trucking business. 
Ms. Hugoe inspected the property and the adjacent area and observed that the property 
was being used for truck and equipment parking that seemed to be consistent with the zoning 
use. 
Plaintiffs purchased the property on June 11, 1991 and immediately began parking their 
trucks on their property. 
Shortly after purchase they began hauling fill onto the property, some of it from projects 
they were working on in the city. A Scott Anderson from the city informed Ms. Hugoe that they 
needed a fill permit to place fill on the property. 
On August 12,1991 Ms. Hugoe went to the Woods Cross City offices to get a fill permit. 
She talked to Mr. Stephens; he informed her that the city had just adopted the fill ordinance and 
they were still in the process of setting up policies and procedures. They did not have a fill 
permit form yet so Mr. Stephens used a building permit form. They discussed the type of fill 
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they were using and that it was coming from city streets and other sources. He said it could not 
contain wood or concrete. He was aware that they were a trucking company. 
Ms. Hugoe testified that Mr. Stephens said nothing about plaintiffs not being able to use 
the property for parking trucks or that they needed a site plan. 
Mr. Stephens said he could not remember discussing that with her but conveniently 
produced a memo to the file stating he told her that she needed a site plan and gave her a site 
plan application. 
The permit itself makes no mention of the site plan requirement or any particular use, and 
the comment portion of the permit is blank. The fill permit was signed by Mr. Stephens on 
August 13, 1991, the same date that the memo to the file bears. 
Plaintiffs proceeded to complete the fill of the property hauling in approximately 100 
truck loads of fill, which was topped by other materials to provide a smooth surface for the 
parking of their trucks. The value of the fill and the work performed to grade it and finish it was 
over $100,000. 
All fill was completed by Spring of 1992. At all times after their purchase of the property 
they continued to park trucks on their property. When the fill operation temporarily required 
them to move their trucks they parked them on the Fleming property next door. 
Use of the property by plaintiff to park trucks was consistent with other property uses in 
the area. Use of the property in the area for commercial and industrial purposes has changed 
very little over the years. 
In the early part of 1992, Woods Cross City adopted a new zoning ordinance which 
changed the zoning on plaintiffs' property and other property in the area to I-l, light industrial. 
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On March 27,1992, plaintiffs received a letter from Woods Cross City informing them 
for the first time that the use of their property for parking trucks was in violation of the new 
zoning ordinance. The letter gave plaintiffs until April 20,1992 to cease and desist. Plaintiffs 
refused to comply with the order and after numerous demands over the years, on November 13, 
1997, defendant's attorney sent a letter to plaintiffs. The letter stated that unless they complied 
within 14 days court action would be started to force compliance. 
As a result of that letter this action was filed by plaintiffs and this trial ensued. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court rules as follows: 
RULING 
Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to continue the use they now make of the property, 
which consists primarily of a storage yard for their trucks and trailers, through the operation of 
estoppel, occasioned by defendants acts and omissions, as a non-conforming use under the 
defendants' new zoning ordinance. Plaintiff also must prove the use of their land meets the legal 
requirements to be considered a non-conforming use. Therefore, although both issues are 
interrelated, the Court will address the estoppel issue first, as a determination in plaintiffs' favor 
on the estoppel issue helps satisfy one of the elements required under non-conforming use. 
ESTOPPEL 
Current Utah law relating to zoning estoppel is primarily set forth in two opinions of the 
Utah Supreme Court: Utah County v. Young. 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); and Western Land 
Equities v. City of Logan. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). Peculiarly, although the two cases were 
released only one month apart, there is no mention in either of the other, although the issues 
discussed often overlap. Western Land, the latter of the two, discusses the law of zoning 
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estoppel as if no Utah court, let alone the very same court a mere one month prior, had ever 
addressed the issue, citing case law from other jurisdictions in illustrating possible approaches to 
the issue. The Western Land Court ultimately concludes that an application of zoning estoppel 
would not be correct in that case, proceeding instead to analyze the case under a "vested right" 
theory, certainly related, but not quite the same. The Court states: 
In rejecting the zoning estoppel approach in this matter, we are not prepared 
to state that it would never be relevant to a determination of the validity of a 
retroactive application of a zoning ordinance. We are of the view, however, that the 
relevant public and private interests are better accommodated in the first instance by 
a different approach. 
Western Land. 617 P.2d at 392-393. The Court then proceeds to discuss how and when property 
owners' rights to a particular use might vest. In Western Land, the facts were that the owner had 
purchased the land, and then, before any construction or other use of the property commenced, 
the city amended its zoning ordinance, precluding the use for which the owner had intended for 
the property. Rejecting a balancing-test type approach based on a weighing of the resources 
which an owner has committed to a project against the possibility of other appropriate uses of the 
land and the public welfare, the Court held that: 
[A]n applicant is entitled to a building permit or subdivision approval if his proposed 
development meets the zoning requirements in existence at the time of his 
application and if he proceeds with reasonable diligence, absent a compelling, 
countervailing public interest. Furthermore, if a city or county has initiated 
proceedings to amend its zoning ordinances, a landowner who subsequently makes 
application for a permit is not entitled to rely on the original zoning classification. 
Id., at 396. It appears to the Court that the facts of Western Land do not fit well with the facts of 
the present case. Here, there is no dispute that a permit was indeed issued, rather than simply 
applied for, although the parties dispute that permit's relevance. Plaintiffs do not seek, in this 
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action, a building permit at all, rather they seek a determination that the use they presently make 
of their property is legally non-conforming under the current zoning ordinance. Furthermore, as 
found by the Court, the property was used the same before the ordinance was changed as it is 
presently. As stated above, and addressed more fully below, to be currently legal as non-
conforming, it must have been allowable under the prior zoning ordinance. The case that is most 
directly controlling with respect to that issue is Utah County v. Young {supra). There the 
Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of estoppel in a zoning case. There was no 
intervening zoning change, as there was in Western Land, and as there is in this case, yet the 
intervening zoning change is only a secondary issue in this case if the Court finds the use legal 
under the prior zoning law. 
The facts of Young are essentially as follows: The landowners owned property zoned for 
agricultural use only. They applied to the county for a building permit, for a "J"-type non-
residential, non-public use building, such that would include a barn. The permit was issued for 
the construction of a barn, with an estimated value of $1,600. The landowners thereafter 
proceeded to construct a building which, although resembling a barn, included an auction block, 
bleachers, commercial plumbing and wiring, and which cost $23,000, and began operating a 
livestock auction. The trial court found that at the time the landowners applied for their building 
permit, and all through the intervening time until the county brought the action, the landowners 
"knew that such a use would not be permitted under the zoning laws, and no agent or employee 
of Utah County led them to believe otherwise." The trial court stated on the matter: 
The only defense presented by the defendants was that they were entitled to 
the application of equitable principles to prevent the county from enjoining his use 
and operation of the land as a commercial 'Auction Barn1 because of claimed 
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misleading acts inducing his belief that on completion of the structure he would be 
entitled to commercial use of it. The findings of the advisory jury, concurred in by 
the Court, do not support any such misleading action, and to the contrary establish 
that the defendants well-knew the zoning restrictions, and that they precluded 
commercial use of the structure. Therefore, the rules of equity do not assist them in 
their claim and the right of plaintiff to a permanent injunction prohibiting further 
commercial use of the property is granted by the Court. 
Young. 615 P.2d at 1266-67. The landowners claimed that even though they had knowledge of 
the zoning laws, the alleged misleading actions of the building inspector should have entitled 
them to an estoppel. On three grounds the Supreme Court ruled against the landowners. First, 
the trial court found that there was no misleading by the county's agents. Second, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
[T]he structure, itself, which resembles a barn, does not violate the zoning laws; it 
is only the commercial use thereof that is proscribed. Third, as a matter of law, 
estoppel may not be used as defense by one who has acted fraudulently, or in bad 
faith, or with knowledge. 
Id., at 1267. The Court goes on to establish the elements of a claim of estoppel in a zoning case 
as follows: 
To invoke the doctrine the county must have committed an act or omission upon 
which the developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in 
position or incurring extensive expenses. The action upon which the developer claims 
reliance must be of a clear, definite and affirmative nature. If the claim be based on 
an omission of the local zoning authority, omission means a negligent or culpable 
omission where the party failing to act was under a duty to do so. Silence or inaction 
will not operate to work an estoppel. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
landowner has a duty to inquire and confer with the local zoning authority regarding 
the uses of the property that would be permitted. 
Id., at 1267-68. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the trial court's 
judgment against the landowners. 
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Here, the facts, as stated, supra, would show an entirely different scenario than those at 
issue in Young. The property in question had been historically used, first in Davis County, and 
later, after being annexed into defendant Woods Cross, for the parking of trucks, the same use for 
which defendant seeks an injunction. It had been so used, on a continuous basis, known to both 
Davis County and defendant, for at least 6 years prior to the time it was purchased by 
plaintiffs. The surrounding property owners had made similar use of their (identically-zoned) 
land. Defendants' mayor had induced the prior owners of plaintiffs' land to agree to the 
annexation with the assurances that they could continue using the land in the manner which that 
prior owner, and current plaintiffs, were using it. Plaintiffs went to defendant's offices and 
reviewed the zoning ordinance, and reasonably believed (as set forth, infra) the use they wished 
to put the land to would be allowed. After purchasing the land and continuing to use it as it had 
been historically used, plaintiffs began to put fill on the land to make it more acceptable for the 
parking of their trucks. Part of this fill came from the rotograding of defendant's streets, a fact 
known to defendant. 
They were then contacted by defendant and told that they needed to get a "fill permit" 
before continuing to place the fill, but, significantly, they were not told that they could not park 
their trucks on the land. Plaintiff Debbie Hugoe then went to the defendant's offices and 
procured the "fill permit" from Tim Stephens, defendant's director of community development. 
Mr. Stephens was fully aware that plaintiffs owned and operated a trucking company, that they 
parked their trucks on the subject property, and that they were obtaining the fill permit to 
improve the conditions on that property for such truck parking. 
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There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether Mr. Stephens told Ms. Hugoe that they 
needed a site plan. Ms. Hugoe stated that there was no such mention. Mr. Stephens says he 
can't remember, but he conveniently produced a memo to the file referring to a conversation 
about the site plan. 
The Court finds it inconsistent that an event that was so important that it triggered a 
memo to the file would not have likewise triggered at least a notation or comment on the fill 
permit. The fill permit was signed by Mr. Stephens on the same date as the file memo but is 
silent on the issue. The comment portion is blank. 
After obtaining the "fill permit," plaintiffs continued to place fill on the property, 
eventually placing fill and performing grading, all with a value well over $100,000. It was only 
as this work was being completed that defendant informed plaintiffs of the recent zoning change 
that prohibited the use plaintiffs were making of their property. Defendants argue that no site 
plan had been approved, no building permit issued, and that plaintiffs use therefore could not 
have been "lawfully existing" prior to the zoning change. As support, they cite Western Land. 
The Court finds little credence in their argument for several reasons. First, as set forth, supra, 
Western Land is primarily concerned with the vesting of rights in instances where a zoning 
changes before a use is made of a property, a scenario different than that before the Court. 
Second, the "fill permit" issued by defendant was issued long after the current use was 
made of the property, and was only obtained for leveling off and making the property more 
serviceable under its current (and prior) use. Plaintiffs needed no building permit to use the land 
in the manner in which it had always been used, in fact there were no "buildings" needed 
whatsoever. As to defendant's argument that a "site plan" was needed to be legal, the Court 
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cannot agree. The only thing that changed when ownership changed was the name and shape of 
the trucks being parked on the land. There are no allegations that Davis County, the prior zoning 
authority, had required a site plan and that there had been a failure to comply. There is no 
evidence before the Court that the use had ever, prior to 1992, been questioned by any authority 
as being anything but proper. Certainly defendants do not require a site plan every time a 
business property is sold and new owners use the property for essentially the same purpose, 
without major change. When minor changes are sought, a building permit, not a site plan, is 
required. The language of the site plan ordinance is telling in this regard: 
SITE PLAN. In any commercial or manufacturing zone, and in all zones where 
construction of main buildings or dwellings other than single-family dwellings is 
proposed or involved, the location of main and accessory buildings on the site and 
in relation to one another, the traffic circulation features within the site, the height 
and bulk of buildings, the provisions for off-street parking space, the provisions for 
driveways for ingress and egress, and for the installation of curb, gutter and /or 
sidewalk when not already in place along the street bordering, and provision for other 
open space on the site, and the display of signs shall be in accordance with a site plan 
or plans or subsequent amendment thereof, approved in any case by the Planning 
Commission prior to the issuance of a Building or Land-Use permit... 
(Section 11-18-9 of defendants' former City ordinances. This is the text submitted by defendant 
as part of their reply memorandum to their motion for summary judgment.) It is clear that a site 
plan is needed for construction purposes that change the character and use of the land, but not for 
continued use of the land, by new owners, under a previously allowable use. 
Third, and finally, even if the Court was to proceed under Western Land, it is undisputed 
that plaintiff applied for, and obtained a "fill permit." The fill permit was granted with 
defendant's knowledge that plaintiff was using the fill to be able to better park his trucks, a use 
that had gone on for years prior. This Court can see no reason to limit the holding of Western 
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Land to only building permits and subdivision approvals. Other types of permits may reference 
the same type of rights, such as the liquor license in Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control 
Comm'n. 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979). Defendant required plaintiffs to obtain a fill permit to place 
fill, fill that plaintiffs felt was necessary to make better, but the same, use of their property. The 
permit was obtained, and plaintiffs continued the same use thereafter. As plaintiffs actually 
obtained the only type of "building permit" either party reasonably might argue was ever at issue 
in this case, with the full knowledge of defendant that the prior use would be continued, Western 
Land cannot but help plaintiffs' case, to the extent that it applies. 
Reviewing the elements of estoppel set forth by Young, defendant must have: 
JL Committed an act or omission, and if an omission, it must be a negligent or 
culpable omission, where the party failing to act was under a duty to do so. 
The Court finds that Mr. Stephens, in first requiring and then issuing a fill permit to 
plaintiffs, knowing full well the use to which the property was being put and would be put in the 
future, without telling plaintiffs that there was any problem with that use, or noting the same on 
the fill permit, constitutes a negligent omission by one who had a duty to act. Mr. Stephens' 
omission was not mere silence or inaction, as may have been the case in Young. He had personal 
knowledge of the use of the property, a use which had never been questioned by defendants, and 
a use which could reasonably be allowed under the then current zoning ordinance. If he had 
questions or believed that use to be improper, then was the time to speak, not after plaintiffs had 
expended substantial resources. 
2. Good faith reliance on the act or omission in making substantial changes in 
position or incurring extensive expenses. 
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The Court finds that there is evidence only of good faith on the part of plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs had no knowledge that there was even a potential problem with their land use until 
defendants informed them of the zoning change after significant resources had already been 
committed to the fill project. The Court also rules that the expenses, with a value greater than 
$100,000, outlaid by plaintiffs in such reliance were "extensive." 
2* Duty to inquire and confer with the local zoning authority regarding the uses of 
the property that would be permitted. 
Plaintiff went to defendant's offices and reviewed the local zoning ordinance before 
purchasing the property. The specific language of the zoning ordinance itself caused her to 
reasonably believe that the use, a use to which the property had been put by the prior owners, 
would be allowed. Knowing that the prior owners, as well as the surrounding property owners 
used their identically zoned property in the same or similar manner, with defendant's 
longstanding acquiescence, a review of the ordinance must have seemed nothing more than a 
formality to plaintiffs. 
The Court cannot envision how, under the facts of this case, plaintiffs would have had a 
further duty to "inquire and confer" with the local zoning authority to be sure they could use the 
property the same way it had been historically used, the same way surrounding property owners 
used their property, especially in light of the zoning ordinance's seeming express approval of 
such use. 
The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs have met the elements required by Young to 
estop defendant from arguing (or prosecuting plaintiff in a criminal or administrative case) that 
plaintiffs' use of their property was not legally conforming to the prior zoning ordinance. 
13 
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Legal Non-Conforming Use 
To enable plaintiffs to prove they are entitled to continue their use, a use which is 
indisputably not allowed as a conforming use under the current zoning ordinance, they must 
show that it meets the requirement to be a non-conforming use under the applicable law. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-103(k) states: 
(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that: 
(I) legally existed before its current zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation 
governing the land changed; and 
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with the zoning 
regulations that now govern the land. 
The Court's finding as to the first element is set forth in the prior section, supra. As an 
independent, but interrelated as it goes to the issue of plaintiffs' reasonable belief under estoppel, 
grounds for finding the first element required for a non-conforming use, the Court sets forth the 
following: Under the zoning ordinances in effect at the time plaintiffs purchased their property 
and when they began their current use, their land was zoned "C-2." Permitted uses under C-2 
include "transfer company." The parties are in disagreement as to the definition of a "transfer 
company." The zoning ordinance itself provides no definition of "transfer company," neither is 
it defined by Utah statutory or case law. The Court found one case, from Missouri, that 
attempted to define its meaning. The court in Armco SteeL v. Citv of Kansas Citv. Missouri. 883 
S.W.2d 3, 8-9 (Mo. 1994) states: 
The term "transfer company" is defined as "a transportation company that transfers 
passengers or baggage usually for a short distance between specified points or 
terminals." Webster's Third International Dictionary (Unabridged) at 2427. In a 
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broader sense used to describe certain litigants in Missouri case law, a transfer 
company includes any company in the business of transporting freight or other 
products for hire. See, e.g., State ex rel. Beaufort Transfer Co., 610 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. 
App. 1980); Govreau v. Farmington Transfer Co., 473 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. App. 1971); 
Mason v. F.W. Strecker Transfer Co.. 409 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. 1966). 
In Utah, there have been several cases dealing with "transfer companies." Sims v. Public 
Service Commission 117 Utah 516; 218 P.2d 267 (Utah 1950) dealt with the "Salt Lake Transfer 
Company" and its permit as a contract motor carrier to haul sugar for the "Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Company" between West Jordan and Salt Lake City, Utah. Murphy, dba Alex Pickering 
Transfer Company, v. Public Service Commission, 514 P.2d 804 (Utah 1973) dealt with a permit 
dispute against the Utah P.S.C. by a contract carrier. Ostler V. Albina Transfer Company, Inc., 
781 P.2d 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) is a personal injury action discussing an accident involving a 
"truck and semitrailer unit parked on the paved shoulder of the roadway." 
Plaintiff Hugoe Trucking, Inc. is a contract motor carrier licensed by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the State of Utah. It is the Court's ruling that Hugoe Trucking is a 
"transfer company" within the meaning of defendants' prior zoning ordinance. Defendants 
would like to persuade the Court that the proper classification of plaintiffs' use of their property 
is one found under zone "M-2," at (E), "Equipment yards, contractor's yard and storage." 
Apparently this is as a result of Hugoe trucking's frequent work with contractors, hauling 
construction materials. The only evidence before the Court is that plaintiff Hugoe Trucking is 
not, and never has been, a contractor. 
It is clear that under Utah law: 
[Zjoning ordinances are in derogation of a property owner's common-law right to 
unrestricted use of his or her property, provisions therein restricting property uses 
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should be strictly construed, and provisions permitting property uses should be 
liberally construed in favor of the property owner. 
Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah Ct App. 1995). 
Plaintiff Hugoe Trucking is a trucking, and thus, "transfer" company. Nowhere in the prior 
zoning ordinance is there a specific mention of any zone designated for "trucking company." 
The only possibility is under "transfer company." The Court therefore finds that the use of 
plaintiffs' property prior to the zoning change was "legally existing." 
It has not been argued by the parties, and is thus apparently not at issue, but the Court 
also finds that the use was "maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation 
governing the land changed." There was a period of time when plaintiffs trucks were parked off-
site to enable the filling and grading process, yet such would not constitute a "discontinuance." 
The Court has been unable to find Utah case law on the issue, but a State of Washington case 
dealing with discontinuance in a non-conforming use stated: 
The mere temporary cessation of a nonconforming use, however, does not 
effect abandonment or discontinuance of the nonconforming use. 8 A E. McQuillin, 
The Law of Municipal Corporations @ 25.196 (3d ed. rev. 1976). 
Andrew v. King County. 586 P.2d 509, 513 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). Therefore, to the extent that 
it is at issue, the Court rules that plaintiffs' use was "maintained continuously since the time the 
zoning regulation governing the land changed." 
The third element is not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the Court would find that 
plaintiffs' current, and past, use of their property is a legal non-conforming use. As such, the 
Court would find in favor of plaintiffs and enjoin any further action by defendant not consistent 
with this ruling. 
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Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to prepare findings and judgment in accordance with the 
Court's Ruling and send a copy to opposing counsel at least 5 days before being submitted to the 
Court for signature. 
Dated May 1^,1998 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY SrPAGE 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on May 
, 1998, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Gregory M. Simonsen 
Clark B.Fetzer 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Michael Z. Hayes 
Attorney for Defendant 
1245 Brickyard Road No. 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
,JL(D 
James\E. Merrell 
Law Cferk, Second District Court 
.cfi. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAMON HUGOE, DEBBIE HUGOE, and 
HUGOE TRUCKING INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal 
corporation and political subdivision of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960700425 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
This matter came before the Court for trial to the Court on February 12,1997. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Gregory Simonsen and Bryan Booth of the law firm of Kirton & McConkie. The 
defendant was represented by Michael Hayes and Todd Godfrey of the law firm of Mazuran & 
Hayes. After the presentation of evidence and argument, the Court took the case under advisement 
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to prepare a written opinion. On May 19,1998, the Court issued a Trial Ruling in favor of plaintiffs. 
The Court now enters these Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. 
I. FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs' property and that of Mr. Richard Fleming lie adjacent to one another on the 
south side of 500 South at approximately 1300 West in Woods Cross City, Davis County, Utah. The 
street known as 500 South is a major East-West thoroughfare in the city. 
2. The legal description of Plaintiff s property is as follows: 
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet 
West and North 0°26f East 330 feet and West 235.8 feet from the 
Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; thence South 670.14 
feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 feet along said street; 
thence North 670.14 feet to the point of beginning. 
AND 
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet 
West and North 0°26' West and North 0°26f East 330 feet and West 
105.8 feet from the Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; 
thence South 670.14 feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 
feet along said street; thence North 670.14 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
ALSO: 
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 627 feet 
West and North 0°26' East 330 feet and West 170.8 feet from the 
Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, Range 1 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian; and running thence West 65 feet; thence South 670.14 
feet to the North line of a street; thence East 65 feet along said street; 
thence North 670.14 feet to the point of beginning. 
ALSO: 
Beginning at a point 238.3 feet West and 181.5 feet South and 660 feet 
West from the Northeast corner of Section 26, Township 2 North, 
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Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian; and running thence North 330 feet; 
thence West 72.8 feet; thence South 330 feet; thence East 72.8 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
Hereafter this parcel shall be referred to as "the property" or "plaintiffs' property." 
3. Both plaintiffs' parcel and Mr. Fleming's parcel were previously owned by Mr. Frank 
Branch. 
4. In December of 1988 both parcels were annexed into Woods Cross City. Prior to 
December 1988, the property was located in the unincorporated area of Davis County. 
5. Mr. Fleming purchased his parcel from Mr. Branch in 1985. Mr. Fleming obtained 
permission from Davis County to place a culvert in front of his property to allow better access and to 
haul in fill. Much of the fill was hauled onto the property from Davis County retention basins as a 
result of the 1983 flooding. 
6. Mr. Fleming is in the construction business. Since he purchased the property in 1985, 
he has used it continuously to park dump trucks, belly dumps, and various other pieces of heavy 
equipment. 
7. Mr. Branch retained ownership of the parcel now owned by the plaintiff. Over the 
years from at least 1985 until 1991, Mr. Branch allowed Mr. Clarence Newman to use the property. 
Mr. Newman was in the insulation business and used the property to park semi-trucks and trailers 
and large insulation trucks. 
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8. The use of the two parcels for truck and equipment parking was open and obvious and 
clearly observable to anyone traveling on 500 South. The use continued from at least 1985 until 
present. 
9. In the year leading up to annexation of the property into Woods Cross City, Mr. 
Branch and Mr. Fleming had several conversations with the then Woods Cross City mayor, Mr. 
Argyle, and attended several public meetings where they were encouraged to consent to annexation, 
with the assurance that they would be able to continue the current use of their property. Ms. Debbie 
Hugoe also attended some of these same meetings with her aunt who was a resident of the area. 
10. Prior to June 1991 plaintiffs became interested in purchasing the property, and Ms. 
Hugoe went to the Woods Cross City offices to check the zoning of the property. She spoke with 
Mr. Tim Stephens, the Community Development Director. He gave her a copy of the zoning 
ordinance, which showed the property was in a C-2 zone. She noted that a permitted use in that zone 
was a "transfer company." 
11. Ms. Hugoe told Mr. Stephens that she operated a trucking company. Trucks bearing 
the Hugoe Trucking logo were often on the streets of Woods Cross City. Hugoe Trucking had been 
used on several road construction jobs in the city hauling road base and "roto-mill" to and from the 
road projects. Mr. Stephens was aware that the Hugoes were involved in a trucking business. 
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12. Ms. Hugoe inspected the property and the adjacent area and observed that the 
property was being used for truck and equipment parking that seemed to be consistent with the 
zoning use. 
13. Plaintiffs purchased the property on June 11,1991 and immediately began parking 
their trucks on their property. 
14. Shortly after purchase, plaintiffs began hauling fill onto the property, some of it from 
projects they were working on in Woods Cross City. A Scott Anderson from the city informed Ms. 
Hugoe that they needed a fill permit to place fill on the property. 
15. On August 12,1991 Ms. Hugoe went to the Woods Cross City offices to obtain a fill 
permit. She talked to Mr. Stephens about the permit. Mr. Stephens informed her that the city had 
just adopted the fill ordinance and was still in the process of setting up policies and procedures. The 
city had not yet designed a preprinted fill permit form, so Mr. Stephens used a preprinted building 
permit form. Mr. Stephens and Ms. Hugoe discussed the type of fill plaintiffs were using and that 
the fill was coming from city streets and other sources. He was aware that Ms. Hugoe's business, 
Hugoe Trucking, Inc, was a trucking company. 
16. At trial there was conflicting evidence as to whether Mr. Stephens told Ms. Hugoe 
that a site plan was required for the property. The court having weighed the credibility of the 
witnesses and the evidence finds that Ms. Hugoe's testimony that no site plan was discussed is the 
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most credible. Hence, the court finds that Mr. Stevens did not tell Ms. Hugoe of any site plan 
requirement. 
17. The fill permit issued to Ms. Hugoe by Woods Cross City makes no mention of the 
site plan requirement or any particular use, and the comment portion of the permit is blank. The fill 
permit was signed by Mr. Stephens on August 13,1991. 
18. Plaintiffs proceeded to complete the fill of their property by hauling in approximately 
100 truck loads of fill which was topped by other materials to provide a smooth surface for the 
parking of plaintiffs' trucks. The value of the fill and the work performed to grade it and finish it 
was over $100,000. 
19. The filling of the property was completed by Spring of 1992. At all times after their 
purchase of the property, plaintiffs continued to park trucks on their property. When the fill 
operation temporarily required them to move their trucks, plaintiffs parked their trucks on the 
neighboring Fleming property. 
20. The plaintiffs' use of the property to park trucks was consistent with other property 
uses in the area. Use of the property in the area for commercial and industrial purposes has changed 
very little over the years. 
21. In the early part of 1992, Woods Cross City adopted a new zoning ordinance which 
changed the zoning on plaintiffs' property and other property in the area to 1-1, light industrial. 
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22. On March 27,1992, plaintiffs received a letter from Woods Cross City informing 
plaintiffs for the first time that the use of their property for parking trucks was in violation of the new 
zoning ordinance. The letter gave plaintiffs until April 20,1992 to cease and desist. Plaintiffs 
refused to comply with the order, and after numerous demands over the years, defendant's attorney 
sent a letter to plaintiffs on November 13,1997. The letter stated that if plaintiffs did not comply 
within 14 days, court action would be initiated to force compliance. 
23. As a result of that letter this action was filed by the plaintiffs and this trial ensued. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes the following conclusions of law. 
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court finds that the plaintiffs have established the elements for zoning estoppel 
set forth in Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980). 
2. The Court finds that Mr. Stephens' actions in first requiring and then issuing a fill 
permit to plaintiffs, knowing full well the use to which the property was being put and would be put 
in the future, without telling plaintiffs that there was any problem with that use, or noting the same 
on the fill permit, constitute a negligent omission by one who had a duty to act. Mr. Stephens' 
omission was not mere silence or inaction, as may have been the case in Young. He had personal 
knowledge of the use of the property, a use which had never been questioned by defendant, and a use 
which could reasonably be allowed under the then current zoning ordinance. If he had questions or 
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believed that use to be improper, then was the time to speak, not after plaintiffs had expended 
substantial resources. 
3. The Court also concludes that there is evidence only of good faith on the part of the 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs had no knowledge that there was even a potential problem with their land use 
until defendant informed them of the zoning change after significant resources had already been 
committed to the fill project. The Court also rules that the expenses, with a value greater than 
$100,000, outlaid by plaintiffs in such reliance were "extensive." 
4. The court also finds that plaintiffs inquired and consulted zoning authorities and 
reviewed zoning ordinances regarding use of the property. Ms. Hugoe went to defendant's offices 
and reviewed the local zoning ordinance before purchasing the property. The specific language of 
the zoning ordinance itself caused her to reasonably believe that the use, a use to which the property 
had been put by the prior owners, would be allowed. Knowing that the prior owners, as well as the 
surrounding property owners, used their identically zoned property in the same or similar manner, 
with defendant's longstanding acquiescence, a review of the ordinance must have seemed nothing 
more than a formality to plaintiffs. 
5. The Court cannot envision how, under the facts of this case, plaintiffs would have had 
a further duty to "inquire and confer" with the local zoning authority to be sure they could use the 
property the same way it had been historically used and the same way surrounding property owners 
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used their property, especially in light of the zoning ordinance's seemingly express approval of such 
use. 
6. The Court therefore finds that plaintiffs have met the elements required by Young to 
estop defendant from arguing in this action (or any criminal or administrative action) that plaintiffs' 
use of their property was not legally conforming to the prior zoning ordinance. 
7. The Court finds that plaintiffs have met the requirements to establish a valid pre-
existing nonconforming use. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-103(k) states: 
(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that: 
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation 
governing the land changed; and 
(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with the zoning 
regulations that now govern the land. 
8. The Court's conclusion that the use legally existed before the current zoning is set 
forth in the prior section. As an independent, but interrelated, grounds for finding the first element 
required for a non-conforming use, the Court sets forth the following: Under the zoning ordinances 
in effect at the time plaintiffs purchased their property and began their current use, the property was 
zoned "C-2." Permitted uses under C-2 include "transfer company." It is the Court's ruling that 
Hugoe Trucking is a "transfer company" within the meaning of defendant's prior zoning ordinance 
and that Hugoe Trucking's use of the property was and is consistent with this designation. 
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9. It has not been argued by the parties, and is thus apparently not at issue, but the Court 
also finds that the use of the property was "maintained continuously since the time the zoning 
regulation governing the land changed." There was a period of time when plaintiffs trucks were 
parked off-site to enable the filling and grading process, yet such would not constitute a 
"discontinuance." Therefore, to the extent that it is at issue, the Court rules that plaintiffs' use was 
"maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation governing the land changed." 
10. The third element is not disputed by the parties. Therefore, the Court would find that 
plaintiffs' current, and past, use of their property to park trucks in conjunction with their trucking 
business is a legal, non-conforming use. 
III. JUDGMENT 
The Court hereby enters judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The Court rules that plaintiffs fall 
within the definition of a "transfer company" under the C-2 zoning in effect at the time plaintiffs 
purchased the property. Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to continue to use their property in a manner 
consistent with this designation, including storing and parking trucks in conjunction with plaintiffs' 
business. The Court permanently enjoins defendant from taking any action to prohibit or prevent 
plaintiffs from using the property in this manner. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover costs pursuant to 
applicable court rules. 
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DATED this S ^ day of , 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Rodney S. Ealge 
District Judge 
a 
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s 
Gregory M. Simonsen (#4669) 
Clark B.Fetzer (#1069) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
f-
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAMON HUGOE, DEBBIE HUGOE, and 
HUGOE TRUCKING INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WOODS CROSS CITY, a municipal 
corporation and political subdivision of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 960700425 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The above-captioned matter came before the court on Tuesday, December 16,1997 for 
hearing on defendant Woods Cross City's motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs Damon 
Hugoe, Debbie Hugoe and Hugoe Trucking, Inc.'s cross-motion for summary judgment. At the 
hearing the plaintiffs were represented by Gregory M. Simonsen and the defendants were represented 
0 0 0 0 0 3 1 
by Michael Hayes and Todd Godfrey. The court, having previously reviewed the memoranda, 
exhibits and affidavits submitted by the parties and having heard argument of counsel finds that 
genuine issues of fact remain making it necessary to deny both motions for summary judgment. 
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that defendant Woods Cross City's motion for summary 
judgment and plaintiffs Damon Hugoe, Debbie Hugoe and Hugoe Trucking, Inc.'s cross-motion for 
summary judgment are denied. 
DATED this IH** day of January, 1998. 
BY THE COURT 
HonorabkJRodney S. Page 
District Court Judge 
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1555 SOUTH 800 WEST • WOODS CROSS, UTAH 84087 • (801)292-4421 • FAX 292-2225 
March 27, 1992 
Damon Hugoe 
945 West 4 00 North 
West Bountiful, Utah 84 087 
Dear Mr. Hugoe: 
Some time ago, this City granted to you a fill permit to fill-
your property located on 500 South in Woods Cross. Since that 
time, it has come to our attention that the property is being used 
for the storage and use of large equipment, dump trucks and 
building materials. You need to be aware that this property is 
zoned 1-1 Light Industrial, which does not permit open storage 
yards. 
The City, therefore request that you cease and desist using 
the property in the above described manner no later than April 20, 
1992, In addition, you should be aware that prior to making use of 
this property, it is required proper site plan review, approvals, 
etc.br received from the City. 
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel 
free to contact me. 
Sincerely, 
TS:lg 
Tim Stephens 
Zoning Administrator 
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CHAPTER 13 
OOHMERCIAL ZONE C~2 
11-12-1: Use Regulations 
11-13-2: Special Provisions 
11-13-3: Area and Frontage Regulations 
11-13-4: Yard Regulations 
11-13-5: Height Regulations 
11-13-6: Coverage Regulations 
11-13-7: Fencing 
11-13-8: Bond 
11-13-1: USg BBCTLATIOHS. In Commercial Zone C-2, no building or land shall 
be used, and no building shall be erected which is arranged, intended or 
designed to be used for other than one or more of the following uses: 
(A) pgfrttTTSD SBM* 
(1) Any permitted use allowed in Commercial Zone C~l. 
(2) Apartment hotel; apartment motel. 
— '") Automobile and trailer sales. 
., Awning sales and repair, 
^(6) Automobile rental agency* 
(6) Baths• 
(7) Bird store. 
(8) Blueprinting or photostating. 
(9) Bus depot. 
(10) Business college or private school operated as a 
commercial enterprise. 
(11) Cleaning establishment. 
(12) Department store. 
(13) Dressmaking shop for retail sales at said shop* 
(14) Electrical and heating equipment. 
(16) Employment agency. 
(16) Film exchange. 
(17) Fix-it shop. 
(18) Flooring or floor repair shop. 
(19) Fur sales, storage and/or repair. 
(20) Furniture store. ^^^mmmK^mmm 
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(21)-.Greenhouse and/or nursery; plant materials, soil and lawn 
service, provided that all incidental equipment and 
supplies, including fertilizer and empty cans, etc. are 
kept within a building. 
(22) Hospitals (except animal) or sanitariums. 
(23) Hotel. 
(24) Ice storage, and retail and wholesale ice stores. 
(25) Laundry. 
(26) Lodge. 
(27) Manufacture of goods to be sold a£ retail on the premises. 
(28) Medical or dental laboratories. 
(29) Music conservatory; music instruction. 
(30) Mortuary. 
(31) Pet shop or taxidermist. 
(32) Plumbing or sheet metal supply shop if conducted wholly 
within a completely enclosed building. 
(33) Printing, lithography or publishing. 
~^(34) Public garage, including automobile repairing and 
incidental body and fender work, painting and upholstering 
if all operations are conducted wholly within a completely 
enclosed building. 
(35) Police or fire station* 
(36) Public services, excepting electric distributing station. 
(37) Rescue mission. 
(38) Retail stores or businesses. 
(39) Second hand store, if conducted wholly within a completely 
enclosed building. 
(40) Sign manufacturing shops, including neon, if conducted 
wholly within a completely enclosed building. 
(41) Studios (except motion picture). 
(42) Telephone exchange. 
—(43) Tire shop operated wholly within a building. 
(44) Travel bureau. 
^(45) Transfer company. 
(46) Upholstering shop, if conducted wholly within a completely 
enclosed building. 
(47) Wedding chapel. 
(48) Wholesale merchandise broker, excluding wholesale storage. 
^(49) Accessory uses and buildings customarily incidental to the 
above. 
(B) CONDITIONAL USES.: 
(1) Any conditional use permitted in Commercial Zone C-l. 
(2) Amusement enterprises, including a billiard or pool hall, 
bowling alley, dance hall, or theater auditorium, 
foxing arena. 
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(5) Circus or amusement enterprise of similar type, transient 
in character* 
(6) Electric substation. 
(7) Games of skill and science. 
(8) Monument works, retail. 
(9) _Penny arcade. 
(10) Planning Mill and cabinet shop. 
(11) Pony riding ring, without stables. 
(12) Shooting gallery. 
(13) Small animal hospital. 
(14) Storage building for household goods and equipment; 
—-—- mini-warehouses. 
(15) Taverns; night clubs; beer parlors. 
(16) Temporary revival church. 
(17) Trade school, if not objectionable due to noise, odor, 
vibration, etc. 
"—(18) Trailer camps for trailers and mobile homes mounted on 
wheels for ready movement or transport. 
(19) Veterinary. 
11-13-2 SPBCIAL PROVISIONS. The above specified stores, shops or businesses 
shall be retail establishments and shall be permitted only under the following 
conditions: 
(A) Such businesses shall be conducted wholly within an enclosed 
building, or on a lot which is enclosed by a solid wall, board 
fence or evergreen hedge not less than 6 feet in height, except 
for the sale of gasoline and oil by service stations, the 
parking of automobiles, and service to persons in automobiles. 
(B) All products produced, whether primary or incidental, shall be 
sold at retail on the premises; and no entertainment, except 
ausic, shall be permitted in cafes, confectioneries, or 
refreshment 8tanda, 
(C) Any exterior sign display shall pertain only to a use conducted 
within the building or lot or shall appertain to the lease or 
the sale of the property; such sign shall be attached flat 
against the wall of the building parallel to its horizontal 
dimension and shall not exceed 100 square feet in area. One 
such sign only »ay be permitted on each wall facing on a 
street. In no case shall nay such sign employ animation or 
flashing lights and shall not project above the height of the 
building more than 36 inches. 
11-13-3: AREA AND FRONTAGE REGULATIONS. None, except off-street parking, 
loading, and unloading spaces, in accordance with Chapter 19, Title XI, of 
these Revised Ordinances. 
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greater height or greater number of stories in said building. 
11-13-6: COVERAGE REGULATIONS, No building or structure or group of 
buildings, with their accessory buildings, shall cover more than 60 percent ol 
the area of the lot. 
11-13-7 FENCING, On lots containing mainbuildings other than single-family 
dwellings fences may be required along the side and/or rear lot lines by the 
Planning Commission. However, for topographical, architectural, structures or 
other reasons, fencing may be waived in whole or in part* Where fences are 
required by the Planning Commission, they shall be either the solid or open 
mesh type with a minimum height of 4 feet and a maximum height of 6 feet. 
Fences along the side lot lines shall extend from any required front yard 
setback to the rear of the lot, but fences may be constructed along the side 
lot lines in the front yard not to exceed 2 feet in height if the solid type or 
4 feet if the open mesh type, 
11-13-8: BOND. A corporate surety or cash bond, or letter of credit from a 
land title company licensed to do business in the State of Utah, or from a 
bank, savings and loan association or other financially responsible lending 
institution, in an amount equal to 2 percent of the construction costs of each 
and every principal building constructed on the lot, other than a single-family 
dwelling, shall be required to guarantee the completion of all site 
development, including, among other things, the landscaping, sprinkling 
systems, driveways, parking areas, sidewalks and curb and gutter; provided, 
however, that the City Council, after recommendation by the Planning 
Com*ission, may accept other security sufficient to guarantee such 
installation. 
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11-13-4 YARD REGULATIONS. 
(A) Side Yards, For main buildings other than dwellings, none 
except that wherever a building is built upon a lot adjacent to 
a residential or agricultural zone boundary, there shall be 
provided a side yard of not less than 10 feet on the side of 
the J>uilding adjacent to the boundary line, and on corner lots 
the side yard which faces on the street shall be not less than 
30 feet. Accessory dwelling units where windows of such 
dwelling are provided adjacent to any side lot line, such 
dwellings shall be provided with a side yard of not less than 
10 feet. 
(B) Front Yard. The minimum depth of the front yard for all 
buildings shall be not less than 20 feet; provided, however, 
that the Planning Commission, as a Conditional Use and after 
consideration of the location of the proposed building, the 
shape and size of the lot or area upon which said building 
would be located, the uses being made of adjoining and nearby 
properties and the building setback thereon, the landscaping 
desired thereon, and such other conditions, elements and 
circumstances as the Planning Commission shall consider 
appropriate and relevant, may approve a lesser setback not to 
exceed a variance of more than 50 percent from the setback 
distance herein set forth. The Planning Commission may also 
approve an awning, canopy, porch or other structure attached to 
any such building in the front yard thereof extending to a 
point, including roof overhang, not closer than one foot from 
the street line, subject to the considerations herein mentioned 
and to the further consideration that prior to approval, the 
Planning Commission shall determine that the proposed awning, 
canopy, porch or other attachment to such building shall not 
unreasonably restrict visibility or sight clearance across the 
major portion of the front yard required by this Section or as 
otherwise modified by the Planning Commission in accordance 
with the provisions and requirements hereof. All billboards 
and other signs having less than 10 feet clearance between the 
ground and sign shall be required to have the same front yard 
as is required of buildings and other structures. 
(C) Rear Yard. The minimum rear yard for all buildings shall be 15 
feet* 
11-13-5 HEIGHT REGULATIONS. The maximum permitted height of buildings shall 
not exceed two and one-half stories of 35 feet, provided that the Planning 
Commission, as a Conditional Use and after consideration of the location of the 
proposed building, the plans for incorporation of an approved fire protection 
•Amended 11-13-4(8) - Ordinance #231 4/6/82 
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CHAPTER 22 
NON-CONFOHMING USE 
11-22-1: When Allowable 
11-22-2: Repairs and Structural Alterations 
11-22-3: Termination of a Non-Conforming Use 
11-22-1: WHEN ALLOWABLE. Any lawful use of buildings or land at the time of 
the passage of this Ordinance, which does not conform to the regulations 
prescribed in this Ordinance, shall be deemed a non-conforming use and such use 
may be continued, but if such non-conforming use is discontinued for the period 
of one year or more, except for residential structures or accessory farm 
structures, any future use of said building or land must be in conformity with 
the provisions of this Ordinance. A non-conforming use may be extended to more 
floor area throughout a building provided no structural changes are made. A 
non-conforming use, if changed to a conforming use, may not thereafter be 
changed back to any non-conforming use. 
11-22-2: REPAIRS AND STRUCTURAL ALTERATIONS. Repairs and structural 
alterations may be made to a non-conforming building provided that the floor 
space of such building is not increased. 
11-22-2: TEHMINATION OF A NON-CONFOHMING USE. The right to operate and 
maintain any non-conforming use or the right to maintain a sign or any 
structure shall terminate whenever the structure or structures in which said 
non-conforming use is operated and maintained and when any non-conforming sign: 
(A) Is damaged or destroyed from any cause whatsoever and the cost^ 
of repairing such damage or destruction exceeds 250 percent of 
the assessed valuation of such structure or the date of such 
damage or destruction or exceeds 50 percent of the replacement 
cost of any such sign; 
(B) Becomes obsolete or substandard or which has been allowed to 
deteriorate to the extent that the cost of replacement or 
renewing such structure or sign exceeds 250 percent of the 
assessed valuation of such structure or exceeds 50 percent of 
the replacement cost of such sign. (It shall be understood 
that in determining such replacement costs of any structure or 
sign there shall not be included therein the cost of land or 
any factors other than the structure or sign itself); 
(C) Is required to be relocated for any reason whatsoever; 
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When a building has been abandoned as evidence by the fact that 
such building has not been used for a lawful use for a period 
of two years. 
(D) 
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annexed to a municipality shall be zoned according to the zone of the annexing 
municipality with which it has the longest common boundary. 
Higtory: C. 1953,10-9-406, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 235, S 22. 
10-9-407. Conditional uses. 
(1) A zoning ordinance may contain provisions for conditional uses that may 
be allowed, allowed with conditions, or denied in designated zoning districts, 
based on compliance with standards and criteria set forth in the zoning 
ordinance for those uses. 
(2) The board of adjustments has jurisdiction to decide appeals of the 
approval or denial of conditional use permits unless the legislative body has 
enacted an ordinance designating the legislative body or another body as the 
appellate body for those appeals. 
History: C. 1953, 10-9-407, enacted by L. merit, effective May 1, 1995, inserted "the leg-
1991, ch. 235, § 23; 1995, ch. 179, § 2. islative body or" in Subsection (2). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
10-9-408. Nonconforming uses and structures. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in this section, a nonconforming use or structure 
may be continued. 
(b) A nonconforming use may be extended through the same building, 
provided no structural alteration of the building is proposed or made for 
the purpose of the extension. 
(c) For purposes of this subsection, the addition of a solar energy device 
to a building is not a structural alteration. 
(2) The legislative body may provide in any zoning ordinance or amendment 
for: 
(a) the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alter-
ation, expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms 
and conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance; 
(b) the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by 
providing a formula establishing a reasonable time period during which 
the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the 
nonconforming use, if any; and 
(c) the termination of a billboard that is a nonconforming use by 
acquiring the billboard and associated property rights through: 
(i)gift; 
(ii) purchase; 
(iii) agreement; 
(iv) exchange; or 
(v) eminent domain. 
(3) If a municipality prevents a billboard company from maintaining, 
repairing, or restoring a billboard structure damaged by casualty, act of God, 
or vandalism, the municipality's actions constitute initiation of acquisition by 
eminent domain under Subsection (2)(c)(v). 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsections (2) and (3), a legislative body may remove 
a billboard without providing compensation if, after providing the owner with 
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reasonable notice of proceedings and an opportunity for a hearing, the 
legislative body finds that: 
(a) the applicant for a permit intentionally made a false or misleading 
statement in his application; 
(b) the billboard is unsafe; 
(c) the billboard is in an unreasonable state of repair; or 
(d) the billboard has been abandoned for at least 12 months. 
(5) A municipality may terminate the nonconforming status of school 
district property when the property ceases to be used for school district 
purposes. 
History: C. 1953,10-9-408, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 235, § 24; 1992, ch. 23, § 12; 1993, 
ch. 286, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1992, inserted "estab-
lishment" in Subsection (2)(a) and added Sub-
section (4). 
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1,1993, 
made a stylistic change in Subsection (lXc); 
rewrote Subsection (2Xc); added Subsection (3), 
redesignating the subsequent subsections ac-
cordingly; substituted "Subsections (2) and (3)" 
for "Subsection (2)n and deleted "or amortiza-
tion" after "compensation" in the introductory 
language of Subsection (4); inserted "intention-
ally" in Subsection (4)(a); and added Subsection 
(4)(d), making related stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Prior nonconforming use. 
Zoning ordinance prohibiting excavation of 
sand and gravel from a parcel of land was an 
invalid exercise of the police power as enforced 
against that particular parcel where the sand 
and gravel had been excavated from the land 
continuously from the time prior to the enact-
ment of the ordinance and where the ordinance 
would cause severe loss to both the owner of the 
land and the public as compared to the rela-
tively small inconvenience to other owners in 
the neighborhood caused by the excavation. 
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 19 
Utah 2d 329, 431 P.2d 559 (1967). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am, Jur. 2d. — 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and 
Planning § 624 et seq. 
CJJ3 . — 101A C. J.S. Zoning and Land Plan-
ning § 154 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Classification and maintenance of 
advertising structures as nonconforming use, 
80A.L.R.3d630. 
Building in course of construction as estab-
lishing valid nonconforming use or vested right 
to complete construction for intended use, 89 
A.L.R.3d 1051. 
Change in area or location of nonconforming 
use as violation of zoning ordinance, 56 
A.L.R.4th 769. 
Addition of another activity to existing non-
conforming use as violation of zoning ordi-
nance, 61 A.L.R.4th 724. 
Change in volume, intensity, or means of 
performing nonconforming use as violation of 
zoning ordinance, 61 A.L.R.4th 806. 
Change in type of activity of nonconforming 
use as violation of zoning ordinance, 61 
A.L.R.4th 902. 
Alteration, extension, reconstruction, or re-
pair of nonconforming structure or structure 
devoted to nonconforming use as violation of 
zoning ordinance, 63 A.L.R.4th 275. 
Validity of provisions for amortization of non-
conforming uses, 8 A.L.R.5th 391. 
PART 5 
RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES FOR ELDERLY 
10-9-501. Residential facilities for elderly persons. 
(1) (a) A residential facility for elderly persons may not operate as a 
business. 
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PARTI 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
10-9-101. Short title-
Air Quality, Transportation, and Land- expenses associated with the task force. The 
Use Task Force. — Laws 1996, ch. 215, ere- task force is to report its findings and recom-
ates the Air Quality, Transportation, and Land- mendations to the Health and Environment, 
Use Task Force to study and recommend a Transportation and Public Safety, and State 
comprehensive policy and solutions to problems and Local Affairs Interim Committees before 
and conflicts regarding the interrelationship of December 31, 1996. Laws 1996, ch. 215 is 
air quality, transportation, and land-use issues, repealed effective December 31, 1996. 
and appropriates $35,000 for compensation and 
10-9-103. Definitions — Notice. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Billboard" means a freestanding ground sign located on industrial, 
commercial, or residential property if the sign is designed or intended to 
direct attention to a business, product, or service that is not sold, offered, 
or existing on the property where the sign is located. 
(b) "Chief executive officer" means: 
(i) the mayor in municipalities operating under all forms of munici-
pal government except the council-manager form; or 
(ii) the city manager in municipalities operating under the council-
manager form of municipal government. 
(c) "Conditional use" means a land use that, because of its unique 
characteristics or potential impact on the municipality, surrounding 
neighbors, or adjacent land uses, may not be compatible in some areas or 
may be compatible only if certain conditions are required that mitigate or 
eliminate the detrimental impacts. 
(d) "County" means the unincorporated area of the county. 
(e) "Elderly person" means a person who is 60 years old or older, who 
desires or needs to live with other elderly persons in a group setting, but 
who is capable of living independently. 
(f) (i) "General plan" means a document that a municipality adopts 
that sets forth general guidelines for proposed future development of 
the land within the municipality, as set forth in Sections 10-9-301 and 
10-9-302. 
(ii) "General plan" includes what is also commonly referred to as a 
"master plan." 
(g) "Legislative body" means the city council or city commission. 
(h) "Lot line adjustment" in a subdivision means the relocation of the 
property boundary line between two adjoining lots with the consent of the 
owners of record, 
(i) "Municipality" means a city or town, 
(j) "Nonconforming structure" means a structure that: 
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; and 
(ii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with 
the zoning regulation's setback, height restrictions, or other regula-
tions that govern the structure, 
(k) "Nonconforming use" means a use of land that: 
(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; 
(ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning 
regulation governing the land changed; and 
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(iii) because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with 
the zoning regulations that now govern the land. 
(1) "Official map" means a map of proposed streets that has the legal 
effect of prohibiting development of the property until the municipality 
develops the proposed street, 
(m) (i) "Residential facility for elderly persons" means a single-family 
or multiple-family dwelling unit that meets the requirements of Part 
5 and any ordinance adopted under authority of that part. 
(ii) "Residential facility for elderly persons" does not include a 
health care facility as defined by Section 26-21-2. 
(n) "Special district" means all entities established under the authority 
of Title 17A, Special Districts, and any other governmental or quasi-
governmental entity that is not a county, municipality, school district, or 
unit of the state. 
(o) "Street" means public rights-of-way, including highways, avenues, 
boulevards, parkways, roads, lanes, walks, alleys, viaducts, subways, 
tunnels, bridges, public easements, and other ways. 
(p) (i) "Subdivision" means any land that is divided, resubdivided or 
proposed to be divided into two or more lots, parcels, sites, units, plots, 
or other division of land for the purpose, whether immediate or future, 
for offer, sale, lease, or development either on the installment plan or 
upon any and all othej plans, terms, and conditions, 
(ii) "Subdivision" includes: 
(A) the division or development of land whether by deed, metes 
and bounds description, devise and testacy, lease, map, plat, or 
other recorded instrument; and 
(B) except as provided in Subsection (l)(p)(iii), divisions of land 
for all residential and nonresidential uses, including land used or 
to be used for commercial, agricultural, and industrial purposes. 
(iii) "Subdivision" does not include: 
(A) a bona fide division or partition of agricultural land for the 
purpose of joining one of the resulting separate parcels to a 
contiguous parcel of unsubdivided agricultural land, if neither 
the resulting combined parcel nor the parcel remaining from the 
division or partition violates an applicable zoning ordinance; 
(B) a recorded agreement between owners of adjoining proper-
ties adjusting their mutual boundary if: 
(I) no new lot is created; and 
(II) the adjustment does not result in a violation of appli-
cable zoning ordinances; or 
(C) a recorded document, executed by the owner of record, 
revising the legal description of more than one contiguous parcel 
of property into one legal description encompassing all such 
parcels of property. 
(iv) The joining of a subdivided parcel of property to another parcel 
of property that has not been subdivided does not constitute a 
"subdivision" under this Subsection (l)(p) as to the unsubdivided 
parcel of property or subject the unsubdivided parcel to the munici-
pality's subdivision ordinance, 
(q) "Unincorporated" means the area outside of the incorporated bound-
aries of cities and towns. 
(2) (a) A municipality meets the requirements of reasonable notice required 
by this chapter if it: 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Urban Plan-
ning and Development — Race and Poverty — 
Past, Present and Future, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 
46. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning 
§§ 10, 169 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations 
§ 226; 101A C J.S. Zoning and Land Planning 
§§ 12 to 15, 65 et seq. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 119, § 7; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943,15-8-95; L. 1949, ch. 15, § 1; 1983, ch. 
33, § 6. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amend-
ANALYSIS 
Prior nonconforming use. 
Rules and regulations. 
Prior nonconforming use. 
Excavation of sand and gravel was valid 
nonconforming use and could not be enjoined 
under zoning ordinance proscribing such use 
since gravel operation had been conducted 
prior to the enactment of the ordinance; nature 
of extractive business contemplated contin-
uance of use over entire parcel of land without 
restriction to immediate area excavated at the 
time the ordinance was passed; and noncon-
forming status was not lost because ownership 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of provi-
sions of zoning statute or ordinance regarding 
protest by neighboring property owners, 7 
A.L.R.4th 732. 
Key Numbers. — Municipal Corporations 
«=» 601.1; Zoning «=» 15, 193 to 195, 359. 
ment substituted "chapter" for "article" 
throughout the section; inserted "the mayor, 
with the advice and consent of"; and made a 
minor change in phraseology. 
of land had changed since enactment of ordi-
nance. Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake 
City, 19 Utah 2d 329, 431 P.2d 559 (1967). 
Rules and regulations. 
The board may make such rules and regula-
tions as are reasonably necessary or expedient 
to enable it to carry out its administrative 
functions and duties, but not the duties and 
powers of the commission. Walton v. Tracy 
Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 
(1939). 
10-9-6. Board of adjustment — Appointment — Limitation 
on exercise of powers as to restrictions on use of 
property — Exemption from operation of ordi-
nance. 
In order to avail itself of the powers provided in this chapter the mayor, 
with the advice and consent of the legislative body, shall appoint a board of 
adjustment, and in the regulations and restrictions adopted pursuant to au-
thority under this chapter shall provide that the powers by this chapter given 
shall not be exercised so as to deprive the owner of any property of its use for 
the purpose to which it is then lawfully devoted, and any ordinance enacted 
under authority of this chapter shall exempt from the operation thereof any 
building or structure as to which satisfactory proof shall be presented to the 
board of adjustments provided for in this chapter that the present or proposed 
situation of such building or structure is reasonably necessary for the conve-
nience or welfare of the public. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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